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Dillon's Other Leg: The Extension of the
Doctrine Which Permits Bystander Recovery
for Emotional Trauma and Physical Injuries
to Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort
Paul R. Joseph*
I. INTRODUCTION
The scene is a residential street in any California community. The
weather being fair, children play out of doors under the watchful eyes
of their parents. The traffic typical of a mobile society flows by. On
one side of the street an inquisitive toddler returns from a short ex-
ploration and begins to cross the street to return to the safety of his'
watching mother. As he carefully crosses the street, a negligently
driven car bears down upon him. Unable to get out of the way, the
youngster is run down and seriously injured or killed.
The child, of course, would have an action against the negligent
driver.2 More significantly for our purposes, since 1968,1 the mother
would have an action for her emotional shock and accompanying
physical injuries caused by witnessing the negligent injury to her
child. The mother's claim is valid even though she was not touched by
* B.A., 1973, Goddard College; J.D., 1977, University of California, Davis; LL.M.,
1979, Temple University. Mr. Joseph is an Assistant Professor of Law at Salmon P. Chase
College of Law, Northern Kentucky University. The author wishes to thank Cecile Dore
Hill for her help in preparing this article.
1. "His" and "He" are used for the child plaintiff and "Her" and "She" for the
witness-plaintiff for convenience. The "classic" form of this case is a mother who witnesses
the injury or death of her child, although the doctrine has not been confined to that par-
ticular factual situation.
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 376-377 (West Supp. 1979).
3. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
Duquesne Law Review
the car, did not fear for her own safety, and was not within the "zone
of danger."4
Now, let us change the situation slightly. The driver did not drive
negligently, but rather hit the child because defectively manufactured
brakes on his car failed. Here the result is very different, although the
town, street, mother, and child are the same. The terrible injury suf-
fered by the child and the equally damaging injuries to the mother are
4. The issue of recovery for mental distress caused by witnessing injury to another
is inextricably linked with the historical reluctance of courts to give any recovery for
emotional distress. The same reasons for the reluctance are usually given in both situa-
tions, and similar rules generally govern the two situations. The early view taken by
courts denied recovery to plaintiff for emotional distress unless she was contemporaneously
injured physically or at least "touched" in some way. As courts became dissatisfied with
that rule, the requirement of physical touching gradually eroded until the least "impact"
justified full recovery for both physical and emotional injuries. Eventually some courts
began to abandon the impact rule, and it is now in fatal decline. To replace the impact
rule many states, including California, decreed that a plaintiff could recover for physical
injury caused by negligently inflicted mental distress if the plaintiff feared she would be
physically touched. The idea grew that if plaintiff were in the zone whereby she might
herself be touched, such recovery would be allowed. It became assumed that at least some
of the plaintiffs fear was for herself and that, therefore, recovery was proper. Hence, the
rule came to be called the "zone of danger" rule.
The plaintiff who feared for another obviously could not recover under the impact
rule. She could recover for the fear of injury to the third party under the zone of danger
rule only if she were close enough to the event that her fear was thought to be a mixture
of fear for herself and the other person. Since it was impossible to separate the two
elements, recovery was allowed for the whole injury. In Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d
43, 45, 319 P.2d 80, 82 (1957) the court explained the rule by saying:
[N]o recovery is permitted for a mental or emotional disturbance, or for a bodily ill-
ness resulting therefrom in the absence of a contemporaneous bodily contact or in-
dependent cause of action or an element of wilfulness, wantonness, or
maliciousness, in cases in which there is no injury other than one to a third person,
even though recovery would have been permitted had the wrong been directed
against the plaintiff.
The zone of danger rule survived until overruled by Dillon. For general information on
the history and status of mental distress recovery as well as on the Dillon doctrine, see
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; 4 B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 548-553 (8th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WITKINJ;
Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to
Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163 (1976-77); Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The
Transcontinental Dispute Between California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Simons]; Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970); Comment, Negligently
Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1970-71);
Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Liability to the Bystander, 11
GONZ. L. REV. 203 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Liability to the Bystander]; Comment,
Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in Cali-
fornia and Other States, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1248 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Reaction to
Dillon].
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also the same. Yet, because the child's action is against the car
manufacturer5 and is grounded in strict liability in tort,6 the mother
may7 have no action to recover for her own psychic shock and physical
injuries.
This article will examine whether this incongruity in the law has a
sensible basis and, if not, whether the relevant legal doctrines should
be expanded to allow recovery in the factual circumstances just
discussed. The focus of discussion will be California because it was
there that the action in negligence for viewing injury to another when
the viewer was not in the zone of danger was first recognized in the
seminal8 case of Dillon v. Legg.9 It was also California that first
recognized strict liability in tort in the field of defective products.1 ° It
was perhaps inevitable that these two doctrines would eventually con-
front each other in the California courts, as has recently happened.
The conflicting holdings in two mid-level appellate cases1' raise the
question which this article will answer: should the Dillon doctrine be
available to a plaintiff suffering emotional shock and physical injuries
as a result of witnessing the serious injury to a close relative caused
by a product manufactured defectively although not negligently? The
analysis of this question will present the reasons which many courts
have used to justify the refusal to adopt the Dillon doctrine in their
jurisdictions. The experience of California and other jurisdictions adopt-
ing the Dillon doctrine will be examined to determine the validity of
the negative reasons given. An examination of the reasons for and
against extending the doctrine to strict liability actions will be made to
determine what, if any, special problems are raised by such an exten-
sion. In this context the California cases which have discussed the
issue will be considered. Although stressing California cases, the arti-
5. An action may be had against any defendant in the marketing chain. See Vander-
mark. v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
6. California adopted strict liability in tort in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The right of recovery was extended
to bystanders in Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1969).
7. The present state of the law in California is unclear. The California Supreme
Court has not ruled on the point, and the lower appellate courts are divided.
8. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 404, 520 P.2d 758, 763, (1974) recognizes that
Dillon is the seminal case in the field.9. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
10. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
11. Compare Park v. Standard Chem Way Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 47, 131 Cal. Rptr. 338
(1976) with Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977), hear-
ing denied (1978).
1979
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cle is equally applicable to all jurisdictions which have adopted the
Dillon doctrine or one of its variants, 2 and the case law of other
jurisdictions will be examined when relevant to the issue being
discussed. Historically, certain reasons for rejecting the doctrine have
,surfaced each time its adoption has been considered. These reasons
should be considered when an extension of the doctrine is con-
templated.
II. DILLON AND NEGLIGENCE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
It has been a long struggle to persuade courts to recognize a cause
of action based upon the observation of negligently-caused injury to
another causing emotional shock and physical injuries to the
observer.1 3 In the years that courts have wrestled with the issue cer-
tain reasons for denying liability have been proposed, adopted, and
quoted in case after case. More recently, as the cautious trend toward
recognition of the tort began to build, 4 these same arguments have
been rejected, often out of hand. In writing either the majority or the
dissenting opinions on either side of the question, judges often reach
into a legal grab-bag, pull out a few standard issues, apply oft-quoted
cliches in support of or in opposition to the doctrine, and move on to a
decision.
In examining an extension of the Dillon doctrine to the area of pro-
ducts liability, it seems important first to carefully reexamine each
issue for and against the doctrine in order to determine which of them,
12. In Dillon, the court ruled that a plaintiff-witness to the negligent injury of
another can recover against the defendant only if the witness suffered physical injury as a
result of the mental distress and only if the witness (a) was located near the scene of the
accident; (b) was closely related to the primary plaintiff; and (c) was injured as a result of
a contemporaneous observance of the accident. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441
P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. In this article "the Dillon doctrine" is sometimes used in
this limited sense, but often it is used generically to indicate recovery by the plaintiff-
witness without the specific requirements imposed by the California Court.
13. The general issue of recovery for emotional distress causing physical injuries was
debated before the turn of the century. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn and Boston R.R. Co., 168
Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (overruled in Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass.
1978)).The specific question of recovery by a witness of negligently caused harm to
another was dealt an early blow when recovery was denied in a case involving a mother
who, after witnessing the death of her child by a negligently operated motor vehicle,
became hysterical and ill, and died as a result of the shock. Waube v. Warrington, 216
Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
14. "Some tendency toward allowing recovery seems to be developing." Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (Mass. 1978). The Massachusetts court enhanced the
trend by adopting and expanding the Dillon doctrine in a case where the plaintiff arrived
on the scene soon after her child was negligently run over by an automobile and suffered
mental distress and shock which caused her death.
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if any, are valid today. In order to do this, each issue must be examined
in its negligence context so that the wisdom of the Dillon doctrine can
be judged, problems it may create can be explored, and solutions to
those problems can be proposed.
A. Lack of Precedent For Extension
On occasion it has been said that the doctrine should not be
recognized because of a lack of precedent. 5 While such an argument
may say no more than "nothing that has not been done, may be done,"
it gains some authority by an appeal to the principles of stare decisis.
The argument suggests that the issue having been decided should not
be reexamined. In actuality, however, such an appeal flies in the face
of the common law system. While one important element in our legal
system is the stability provided by stare decisis, an equally important
element is the case by case development of law in response to chang-
ing conditions. 6
Generally, a rule correctly decided should remain in force as long as
the reasons for the rule continue. 7 To allow the law to change whim-
15. Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash. 2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972). A child, who was
sexually molested by a fifteen year old babysitter, told her mother of the experience and
caused the mother to suffer mental shock. The mother sued the parents of the babysitter,
who knew of the sitter's history of such activity. The court denied the plaintiffs suit but
noted that the facts would not have stated a cause of action under Dillon and left the door
open to consideration of the doctrine when a more appropriate factual pattern presented
itself. Significantly, it was the dissent which suggested lack of precedent as a major
reason for denying recovery in Dillon cases. This reason is often advanced by advocates
of the doctrine and as such it may be something of a straw man. Yet, as recently as 1977,
in Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977), hearing denied
(1978), the dissent noted that no authority existed for allowing the recovery, so perhaps
the reason is still considered seriously by some.
16. In his dissenting opinion in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d
295, 317, 379 P.2d 513, 526, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 46 (1963), Mr. Justice Peters noted that:
So far as the doctrine of stare decisis is concerned, it is, of course, a sound doctrine,
but it is not immutable. Old cases, no matter how numerous, should not stand, if,
under modern and different conditions, they cannot withstand the impact of critical
analysis. The doctrine of stare decisis should never be used as a substitute for such
critical analysis.
17. As one commentator has stated:
Stare decisis is a habit of mind in all walks of life- the professions, business, family
life. One does what one has done before in similar circumstances. It gives stability
and continuity in all human activity. But when it is obvious that one's previous ac-
tions turned out badly, or that circumstances are essentially different, the in-
telligent human being reviews the problem anew; if, with due consideration to
desiderata of stability and continuity, he concludes that something different should
be done in the future, a different course is generally charted.
Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80
HARV. L. REv. 797, 803 (1967).
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sically would destroy the ability to predict legal outcomes of particular
problems-an ability which is an important part of any rational legal
system." On the other hand, legal rules are, of themselves, not the sum
and substance of our law. Rather, the ratio decidendi of a case consists
of the rule of law and the facts which cause the rule to be invoked. 19
When those facts are actually reasons" for denying a cause of action
and those reasons are no longer valid, a rule denying the cause of ac-
tion is no longer valid.2'
The importance of this hypothesis is that it suggests that the merits
of legal rules should periodically be examined to determine whether
they are still valid. A blanket appeal to a lack of precedent or to the
principles of stare decisis ought not to be substituted for such an ex-
amination.22 It is probable that reliance upon the lack of precedent to
deny recovery is really an uneasy articulation that other unspecified
reasons require a denial of the claim. The validity of the other reasons
should control the decision of whether to adopt or to extend the doc-
trine. Those reasons must be independently considered.
18. "The achievement of predictability in law, so that expectations based on
knowledge of the law may be justified and justified expectations be realized, is a function
that opinions should serve." Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 810, 811 (1961), reprinted in R. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS
81-82 (1974).
19. G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 921 (1973).
20. It will be generally conceded that if the material facts of a second case are not
the same as the first then the rule in the first case will not bind the second. There are
cases, however, in which reasons for a decision are treated like material facts which are
the basis of the decision. For example, in many Dillon type cases recovery has been
denied on the basis of the fact that allowing recovery would lead to fraud. It is reasonable
to conclude that in such a case, if fraud is shown not to be a problem then a material
"fact" on which the decision was based is missing and, again, the rule in the first case
should not bind the decision in the second.
21. As has recently been postulated:
There is a danger in our Anglo-American practice of deciding a particular case
before the court and then putting into a judicially announced verbal capsule a
generalized principle upon which the case is decided-for example, "No interest is
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at
the creation of the interest." The danger is that the verbal formulation, properly
adaptable to the case at bar, will then be given quasi-legislative force and woodenly
applied to other cases where the same policy issues are not involved. Too often
neglected is a wise precept: "Every opinion must be read in the light of the facts
then presented." . . . . The key to the Doctrine of Precedent is the old maxim
Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex.
W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING: CASES AND TEXT 884
(1961).
22. Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash. 2d 652, 659, 497 P.2d 937, 941 (1972) (Finley, J.,
dissenting).
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B. Floodgates of Litigation
It has been suggested by some that adoption of the Dillon doctrine
will lead to a massive increase in the amount of litigation.23 The view
seems to be that the vast increase in the number of cases will swamp
the courts, rendering them incapable of handling the flow. This being
the case, the only practical answer is said to be a denial of all such
claims. Many authorities have flatly rejected this rationale for denying
liability." The California Supreme Court, for example, dismissed the
argument in a few choice words, reasoning that "courts are responsible
for dealing with cases on their merits, whether there be few suits or
many; the existence of a multitude of claims merely shows society's
pressing need for legal redress."2 This view has gained wide accep-
tance and has even been noted with approval by at least one court
which refused to adopt the doctrine for other reasons.2"
In fairness, it must be stated that the answer of the California
Supreme Court does not entirely dispose of the issue. Although courts
do exist to decide cases on their merits and judicial expediency should
not, therefore, be the chief basis upon which legal doctrine is formed,
it is not completely unreasonable for courts to take cognizance of the
volume of litigation that will result from the adoption of a particular
legal rule. In a world of limited resources even the judiciary might, at
times, be forced to pick and choose between competing litigants, grant-
ing a hearing to those with the most pressing claims and denying
redress to others. Since legislatures do not show an unlimited will-
ingness to fund the judicial process,' it is unreasonable to expect
courts to turn a blind eye to this administrative factor.
On the other hand, the denial of a valid claim for the sake of ad-
23. See, e.g., 73 DICK. L. REV. 350, 356 (1968-69).
24. See Liability to the Bystander, supra note 4, at 1250 ("Mere speculation about an
increased burden to the judicial system is a questionable basis on which to foreclose
legitimate complaints .... ").
25. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 735 n.3, 441 P.2d at 917 n.3, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77 n.3.
26. "This court has rejected as a ground for denying a cause of action that there will
be a proliferation of claims. It suffices that if a cognizable wrong has been committed that
there must be a remedy, whatever the burden of the courts." Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 615, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 560, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422 (1969). Many discredited ra-
tionales, such as lack of precedent and floodgates of litigation, continue to haunt discus-
sion of the Dillon doctrine. In one recent discussion of the doctrine, 29 ARK. L. REV. 562
(1976), the "proliferation of claims" rationale was duly noted with a citation to Tobin, but
no mention was made of the fact that Tobin rejected that reason for denying the doctrine.
27. It should be noted that recently released figures on judicial expenditures place
California second nationally with a total outlay in 1976 of $281.4 million. NAT'L L. J., May
21, 1979.
1979
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ministrative expediency indicates a breakdown of the ability of the
judiciary to do its job."8 It is not something which should ever be done
without compelling need. The California Supreme Court was correct in
its statement to this extent; since it is the job of courts to hear and
decide cases on their merits, whole classes of cases should not be
denied a hearing because of administrative factors unless it can be
clearly demonstrated that a massive increase in litigation will actually
occur and unless such an increase will result in the denial of a forum to
more deserving litigants. The burden of proof on this issue rests with
those who would deny such claims on administrative grounds.
A review of the authorities shows that no evidence has ever been
presented to demonstrate that the volume of litigation will be large or
that the courts will be unable to handle the flow of such cases.'
Generally, the issue is stated as a self evident conclusion, or as part of
a list of such conclusions. Actually, the evidence suggests that no great
increase in litigation has taken place."0 If the number of appeals in
Dillon cases is any yardstick,31 the increase in litigation has been in-
finitesimal. In the eleven years since Dillon was decided, only nineteen
cases have been heard in the California appellate courts, a fact which
suggests that the volume of litigation has not been a major problem. It
appears, therefore, that no evidence exists to support the view that a
massive increase in litigation will occur if such cases are heard.
Whatever small increase has taken place has been manageable. In the
absence of compelling necessity, claims should not be denied for ad-
ministrative convenience.
C. Problems of Proof
Speaking in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co.,3" Justice
28. "The 'contention that the rule permitting the maintenance of the action would be
impractical to administer ... is but an argument that the courts are incapable of perform-
ing their appointed tasks, a premise which has frequently been rejected.'" Dillon v. Legg,
68 Cal. 2d at 736, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (quoting Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App.
2d 313, 319, 198 P.2d 696, 700 (1948)).
29. Reaction to Dillon, supra note 4, at 1250.
30. See Liability to the Bystander, supra note 4, at 205. ("In fact, the experience of
jurisdictions which have rejected the impact rule has been that the anticipated avalanche
of litigation has failed to materialize").
31. Since the Dillon decision set out a new cause of action, leaving to lower courts
the problem of working out the exact limits of the doctrine, one would expect a higher
than normal level of appeals in Dillon cases, especially during the formative years of the
doctrine.
32. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). Amaya was expressly over-
ruled by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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Schauer suggested that the difficulty in proving the causal link be-
tween the negligent impact to the child and the emotional shock to the
watching mother requires that all such claims be denied, noting that "a
difficult medical question is presented when it must be determined if
emotional distress resulted in physical injury," and that "the resolution
of such conflicts often borders on fancy when the causation of alleged
psychoneural disorders is at issue."33 The court believed that the jury
will be compelled to rely solely upon the subjective testimony of the
plaintiff or at best upon conflicting expert testimony, making the job
of the lay fact finders nearly impossible.34 Even if the causal relation
can be adequately proved, the argument continues, psychic injury is
impossible to measure monetarily, thus making damages speculative.3 5
Why difficulty of proof should justify denial of the cause of action is
unclear. Since causation must be proved by the plaintiff, the difficulty
will fall on her and not on the defendant. Proof problems will tend to
limit the number of cases in which plaintiff will recover. Difficulty of
proof may limit the total number of suits that will be filed under the
doctrine. The effects of this should be to limit the burden of liability on
defendants and reduce any feared increase in the amount of litigation.
Although it may be difficult for plaintiff to win her case, surely the
hardest type of case to win is the one in which plaintiff is not even
allowed to make her proof.3" It is probable that opponents of the doc-
trine actually fear that the fact finder will be forced to rely upon the
subjective report of injury by plaintiff or at best upon confusing and
conflicting expert testimony, thus granting recovery in cases where it
is not warranted.3 7
If the foregoing proof problem creates a fear that such a result will
lead to a massive increase in litigation and to massive unfairness, such
a view has not been borne out to date in those jurisdictions which have
adopted the Dillon doctrine. Both the small amount of appellate litiga-
tion and the few victories by plaintiffs suggest that this fear is exag-
gerated." Some error may still exist, but this is true in all classes of
33. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d at 311, 379 P.2d at 523, 29
Cal. Rptr. at 43.
34. Id. at 312, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
35. Comment, Negligently Caused Mental Distress: Should Recovery Be Allowed?,
13 S.D. L. REV. 402 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Should Recovery Be Allowed].
36. "'[Tihe question of proof in individual situations should not be the arbitrary basis
upon which to bar all actions .... In the difficult cases, we must look to the quality and
genuineness of proof, and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophistication of the
medical profession and the ability of the court and the jury ....' Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d at 616, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561, 249 N.E.2d at 422 (quoting Battala v. New York, 10
N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961)).
37. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 327-28.
38. See notes 23-31 and accompanying text supra.
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cases. The notion that fear of error is itself sufficient reason to deny
recovery has been rejected by the California courts. 9
Although proof problems do not seem to be serious in their effect,
the court in Dillon may have been responding to the issue by requiring
that the injury to the plaintiff be caused by a direct and contem-
poraneous sensory awareness of the event. 0 This tends to limit
recovery to cases in which the causal relation is both clear and direct.
When a mother sees her child run over and suffers emotional shock,
the causal connection seems particularly compelling and the chance of
error is reduced.41
The view that damages for psychic shock are impossible to measure
and are therefore speculative has come under increasing attack in re-
cent years. 2 Basically the argument rests upon the idea that physical
pain is different from mental pain and that while the former can be
measured the latter cannot. In light of current understanding of the
relation between physical and mental pain, such a view does not carry
great weight, since "[iut is probably true that no symptom or complaint
which an individual may have can be differentiated into the purely
mental or purely physical. Every physical pain must have some social,
cultural, and psychological overtones; and even imaginary pain has
physical and physiologic effects on body systems."43 Moreover, the con-
39. In Dillon, the California Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning as
follows:
Indubitably juries and trial courts, constantly called upon to distinguish the
frivolous from the substantial and the fraudulent from the meritorious, reach some
erroneous results. But such fallibility, inherent in the judicial process, offers no
reason for substituting for the case-by-case resolution of causes an artificial and in-
defensible barrier.
68 Cal. 2d at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
40. The Dillon court established three factors to be used to judge the degree of
foreseeability of the injury:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with
one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct
emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance
of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its oc-
currence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Id, at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. Each of the factors confines the scope of
recovery. The second factor most clearly reflects the concern with possible proof prob-
lems.
41. "The impact on a mother of a serious injury to her child of tender years is
poignantly evident. This has always been so." Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d at 615, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 558, 249 N.E.2d at 422.
42. See, e.g., Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash. 2d at 662, 497 P.2d at 943 (Finley, J.,
dissenting).
43. Shafer, Pain and Suffering: How to Evaluate It, in 1A SUCCESSFUL LITIGATION
TECHNIQUES 64.11 (1978).
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nection between the emotional and the physical often means that fear
and distress produce objectively observable and diagnosable symp-
toms, thus making more than the subjective testimony of the plaintiff
available to the fact finder:
Today we know that mental anguish and emotional distress are injuries
as real and as physical in their causes and effects as those that might be
produced by the common law tort of battery. Medical science has learned
how to diagnose and, in large measure, how to cure, these injuries. Their
existence or non-existence is as susceptible of proof (or disproof) as many
physical injuries for which recovery is unquestionably allowed; for in-
stance, a whiplash injury to the neck."
It seems, therefore, that pain is pain and the problems which exist in
attempting to quantify monetary values of mental pain are neither
more than nor less than the difficulty in quantifying the value of
physical pain. Yet, compensation for physical pain and suffering is an
accepted part of tort recovery, while recovery for mental distress is
often attacked.45 More incongruous is the fact that even before Dillon
recovery was available for mental distress under the zone of danger
rule as long as the cause of the injury was fear for oneself. No one
would seriously suggest that damages for fear of injury to one's self
are easier to quantify than damages for fear of injury to one's child. 6
Although there will always be some degree of uncertainty in the area
44. Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash. 2d at 661-62, 497 P.2d at 943 (Finley, J., dissent-
ing).
45. For a detailed look at the issues and problems involved see Brody, Negligently
Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILL. L. REV. 232 (1961-62); Lambert,
Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41 B.U.L. REV. 584 (1961); Leflar & Sanders, Mental
Suffering and Its Consequences-Arkansas Law, 32 U. ARK. BULL. 43 (1939); Smith, Rela-
tion of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli 30 VA. L.
REV. 193 (1944), Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1920-21). See
also note 4 supra. Although the general issue of recovery for emotional distress is beyond
the scope of this article (because California, in the bystander cases, has confined such
recovery to mental distress which causes physical injuries and because within that narrow
limitation it has upheld recovery) the debate continues and may prove interesting.
46. In Dillon, the lower court dismissed the claim of the mother because she suffered
her injury due to fear for her daughter and not for herself. The claim of the first child's
sister was allowed because she was close enough to the accident to be within the zone of
danger and, therefore, to have feared both for herself and for her sister. In rejecting the
distinction, the California Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
The case thus illustrates the fallacy of the rule that would deny recovery in the one
situation and grant it in the other. In the first place, we can hardly justify relief to
the sister for trauma which she suffered upon apprehension of the child's death and
yet deny it to the mother merely because of a happenstance that the sister was
some few yards closer to the accident. The instant case exposes the hopeless ar-
tificiality of the zone-of-danger rule.
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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of proof and qualification of damages the problems seem minor and are
not sufficient to warrant a blanket denial of recovery.
D. The Problem of Fraud
The fear that fraudulent claims will be successfully pressed by plain-
tiffs alleging emotional trauma as a result of their viewing injuries to
others has been suggested so frequently that the late Dean Prosser
concluded that this is the chief reason for denying such claims."7 More
recently, this reasoning has been regularly rejected." The California
Supreme Court stated its view in Dillon v. Legg, reasoning that "the
possibility that fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in isolated
cases does not justify a wholesale rejection of the entire class of claims
in which that potentiality arises."49 The court noted that the same
fears were rejected in order to allow intra-family tort actions0 and
reiterated that, in most cases, the court's normal fact finding processes
were capable of distinguishing the true from the false.51 Further, it was
noted that recovery was already allowed in similar circumstances if
the plaintiff suffered injury due to fear for herself. The court saw no
reason why the possibility of fraud was necessarily higher when the
fear experienced was for the safety of another.52
It is important to realize that "fear of fraud" is not an independent
reason upon which to deny recovery. Rather, it is a conclusion based
upon other supporting reasons. Fraudulent claims may be pressed
because there is no way to prove the injury, or because mentally-
caused damage is difficult to measure monetarily, or because the flood
of resulting litigation will overwhelm the ability of the court to handle
the cases. All of the supporting reasons have been discredited leaving
no basis to fear that fraud will be a major problem. Of course, as in
any other type of case, fraud may take place from time to time, but the
fear of isolated instances of fraud does not justify the denial of all
claims.
Dillon and the hypothetical that is the basis of this article provide
factual situations in which the fear of fraud is low because of the close
47. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 328. See also Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 751, 441 P.2d
at 927, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (Burke, J., dissenting).
48. Reaction to Dillon, supra note 4, at 1249 ("the clear tendency today rejects this
reason for limiting recovery").
49. 68 Cal. 2d at 736, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
50. Id. at 736-37, 441 P.2d at 718, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
51. Id. See also Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d at 1301 ("We have chosen to
leave the detection of fraud and collusion to the adversary process").
52. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 737-38, 441 P.2d at 918-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
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connection between the primary plaintiff and the witness-plaintiff
which leads to a direct and obvious connection between the
defendant's actions and the reaction in the witness-plaintiff. When a
mother sees her child run down by an automobile, there can be little
doubt that the resulting shock and injury to the mother are genuine. 3
Therefore, to the extent that there is any basis for a fear of fraud, it
rests not in the cases before us but rather in other unimagined cir-
cumstances. The fear is that, once recovery is allowed in any cir-
cumstance, the doctrine will "run away" and continually expand until
recovery will be allowed in cases which are so remote and nebulous
that fraud will occur. For this to happen all the normal control
mechanisms of fact finding will have to have broken down. There is an
implicit assumption in the fraud issue that the proof problem in these
cases is so difficult that it will defeat the fact finder. As has been
noted, this is not correct.54
It is, of course, impossible to prove a negative with absolute certainty.
It can be said that those opposing the extension have failed to
demonstrate that fear of serious fraud is a problem or even that the
fear is at all justified. In the years since Dillon, no cry of fraud based
upon actual evidence or pointing to specific cases has been presented.
It is becoming clear that the danger of fraudulent claims has not
become a major problem.55
E. Duty-Burden-Proximate Cause
Courts and commentators have sometimes said that the plaintiff in
Dillon cases is too remote,5 that liability out of proportion to fault will
53. Id. at 735-36, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77. ("we certainly cannot doubt that a
mother who sees her child killed will suffer physical injury from shock"). California limits
recovery for emotional distress to those cases in which physical injuries are caused
thereby. This may be an attempt to limit fraudulent claims by requiring observable symp-
toms before granting recovery. As medical knowledge increases it becomes increasingly
questionable whether such a limitation is justifiable on that ground.
54. See notes 32-46 and accompanying text supra.
55. Reaction to Dillon, supra note 4, at 1249. The same point was recently made in
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d at 1301, the court reasoning as follows:
The facts of cases of this character involve tortious injury to the child and substan-
tial physical consequences to the parent. The tortfeasor is not confronted with the
results of a fleeting instance of fear or excitement of which he might be unaware
and against which he would be unable to prepare a defense. The fact that some
claims might be manufactured or improperly expanded cannot justify the wholesale
rejection of all claims. Of course, there is no suggestion that the physical injuries to
Mr. and Mrs. Dziokonski were contrived. We reject the idea that tort liability in
particular classes of cases must be denied because of the threat of fraud.
56. Note, Dillon v. Legg Ten Years After: A Lawyer's Guide to the California Cases,
10 U.W.L.A. L. REV. 177, 195 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ten Years After].
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be imposed upon defendants, 7 that the injury to the plaintiff is not
proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant, 8 that no duty
is owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, 9 and that the amount of
liability will outstrip the ability of insurance to absorb the claims,"0
thus defeating the policy rationales of loss shifting. While all these
statements are not identical, they are related in that they depend, not
so much upon the facts of Dillon or the hypothetical which is being
considered, but rather upon a policy judgment in response to the
possibility of uncontrollable expansion of the doctrine once it gains
even the slightest recognition.61
To say that no duty is owed or that the injury is not proximate is
merely to state a judicial conclusion, since such terms define the limits
of liability set by considerations of policy.62 The alleged remoteness of
the plaintiff seems to mean no more than that the plaintiff was "un-
foreseeable" in the sense of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,"2 which
again states a judicial conclusion rather than the reasons for that con-
clusion. When one considers the range of risks which a driver creates
in speeding negligently through a residential area, one such risk must
surely be that a child will be struck in full view of his parents. 4 The
emotional distress and resulting psychic shock and physical injuries
which are caused by witnessing the event is a natural consequence of
the negligence. Users of the highways are aware of the close relation be-
tween mother and child. Psychological concepts have percolated into
the consciousness of society to the point where the connection between
emotional and physical injury is no longer surprising or unforeseeable. 5
57. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
58. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 327.
59. Should Recovery Be Allowed, supra note 35, at 404.
60. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d at 314, 379 P.2d at 525, 29
Cal. Rptr. at 45.
61. Id. at 313, 379 P.2d at 524, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 44 ("When, as here, a wholly new type
of liability is envisioned, our responsibility extends far beyond the particular plaintiff
before us, and touches society at large").
62. Both sides of the argument would apparently agree on this point. Compare Dillon
v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (quoting PROSSER, supra
note 4, at 332-33) (concluding that duty "'is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression
of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the par-
ticular plaintiff is entitled to protection") with Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co.,
59 Cal. 2d at 304, 379 P.2d at 521, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 41 ("there is a legal duty on any given
set of facts only if the court or legislature says there is a duty").
63. 248 N.Y. 339, 221 N.Y.S. 912, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
64. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (quoting
PROSSER. supra note 4, at 334) ("'when a child is endangered it is not beyond contempla-
tion that its mother will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock'").
65. The general concept of legal recovery for such distress is also starting to become
more widely known as indicated by the treatment of the issue recently in a popular
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At the same time, such accidents do not seem to be such a regular
occurrence that the number of plaintiffs has been unbearably great.66
Children are not, with such regularity, run over in their parents'
presence, so as to require a complete bar on such claims to maintain
the balance between the insured and the payee. 7 However desirable
the policy of unrestricted utilization of the highway may be, it does not
outweigh the interest of parents in being free from the physical injury
caused by having their children struck down before their eyes. 8
psychology magazine. See Goldstein, You Can Collect For Mental Suffering-Maybe,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (June 1979).
66. See notes 23-31 and accompanying text supra.
67. Contra, Oliphant & Babbit, The Problem of Emotional Trauma: Unsolved By the
Logic of Dillon, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 379 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Oliphant & Babbit].
68. The importance of the interest in unrestricted use of the highways was for-
mulated during a period in our history when such use was encouraged by cheap fuel and
massive highway building programs. As this article is written, California is suffering the
worst gasoline shortage since the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo and the sale of gas is rationed
using the "odd-even" purchasing system. Federal energy officials can be seen nightly on
the news insisting that less use of the highways is the only realistic solution to the energy
crisis. Although it is not suggested that this goal be achieved solely through increasing
liability of the motorist, it may be time to reevaluate the importance of the freedom of the
motorist when balanced against the severe injury to the innocent bystander. It should
also be noted that the policy rationales used to deny recovery in mental distress cases had
early origins. In Space v. Lynn and B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), an early in-
fluential case in the mental distress area, which was finally overruled in Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978), the court held that no recovery could be had for
physical injuries caused by emotional distress suffered when defendant forced another
passenger off its tram, because emotional distress causing physical injuries would only be
suffered by overly sensitive plaintiffs. The view that emotional upset is a part of every-
day life cannot be denied, but the question remains as to how much emotional distress the
average person should be expected to tolerate. The view that all emotional upset should
be borne by the plaintiff should be seen in the context of life at the time, the quality of
which is suggested in the following passage on English life:
The pedestrian received least consideration of all, and the Time of 14 February
1886 recorded that Mr. Dixon Hartland, Member of Parliament, was knocked down
while crossing Queen Victoria Street on his way from Blackfriars Station to the
House of Commons. Several details of the report call for comment. It was stated
that when Mr. Hartland had reached the middle of the road, the defendant suddenly
pulled out of his proper line of traffic and tried to pass a vehicle in front of him.
The result was that the witness was struck violently in the chest by the shaft of
the defendant's cart and knocked down in the mud. From this it is clear that,
although the crossing opposite the station was well used, there was no island
refuge in the centre of the road on to which the pedestrian could jump to safety.
Secondly, although this was a busy street, there was mud in the center of it. In
other words, the crossing sweepers, who were supposed to clear the mire and horse
dung from the street crossings so that the pedestrians could get from one side to
the other without fouling their shoes, had overlooked this part of the street. (The
Court did not condemn them in any way for their negligence.) It was the same in
Regent Street where, in November 1900, a Monsieur van Brantegham, A Belgian,
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The real issue underlying these objections to adoption of the Dillon
doctrine seems to be not so much the unfairness of allowing recovery
in a particular case but rather the potential unfairness in allowing
recovery in all possible third party witness cases. There is real con-
cern that the doctrine will prove, in practice, to be uncontrollable and
that the expansion of the scope of liability under the doctrine in future
cases will result in gross unfairness, making an absolute bar to
recovery the only practical alternative. 9 This fear will not easily be
dismissed. Many of the reasons discussed earlier for denying recovery
in Dillon cases were premised, consciously or not, upon just this fear.
Many of the proposed solutions to the problems rested upon an unar-
ticulated premise that the doctrine could be judicially controlled so as
to allow recovery in deserving cases and to cut off liability when
various policy factors require it. The law of torts is, basically, a system
of loss shifting and regulation."0 If a specific rule of recovery would
severely upset the balance between the parties and result in liability
that is perceived by the courts as grossly unfair, out of proportion, or
destructive of other societal interests, then it is appropriate to define
defendant's duty in such a way as to cut off such liability.7
Thus, the heart of the argument about the Dillon doctrine is
whether judicially defined controls will be able to structure liability so
that appropriate societal interests are maintained. This concern re-
quires more detailed discussion. In the following section the question
of whether the Dillon doctrine can be controlled will be explored.
III. CONTROLLING DILLON: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
The "control" of the Dillon doctrine raises the issue of whether
recovery will be allowed to an observer of negligent conduct who suf-
fers emotional and physical injuries without, by necessity, extending
liability to all the world or at least to such an extent that the burden
on defendants will be too great to be borne. This is really the key
question in discussing the adoption or extension of the Dillon doctrine;
lost a bet of-£65 that he would not walk from Verrey's Restaurant to Swan &
Edgar's, keeping close to the kerb without receiving more than three mud splashes
on his collar. He finished up with five on his collar and two on his face.
J. FISHER, THE WORLD OF THE FORSYTES 77 (1976). Perhaps the level of upset is not the same
in today's world as it was at that time.
69. 73 DICK. L. REV. 350, 356 (1968-69).
70. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 6. ("the law of torts, then, is concerned with the alloca-
tion of losses arising out of human activities... ").
71. Dean Prosser further reasoned that the endeavor to strike a reasonable balance
between the plaintiffs claim to protection from damage and the defendant's claim to
freedom of action for his own ends, occupies a large part of tort opinions. Id.
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the fear that such control will be impossible has led many courts to
refuse such an adoption or extension. 2 The control problem (often called
the problem of unlimited liability) is sometimes coupled with other
reasons for not adopting the doctrine, such as the potential extension
of the doctrine to unforeseeable plaintiffs, its application in cases in
which proof is difficult, and its susceptibility to fraud. Stripped of
these ancillary matters, the basic fear is that even without problems of
fraud or proof, the normal working of the doctrine will result in such a
massive expansion of liability that recovery must be denied." The at-
tack on the doctrine takes two related but not identical forms. First, it
is claimed that there is no way to limit the doctrine," and second, that
even if there were ways to limit the doctrine, such means would be ar-
bitrary and unfair to those plaintiffs who will be denied recovery.15 In
short, it is said that the rule of recovery in such cases must be all or
nothing.
The place to begin in considering these questions is with the plain-
tiff. It is hard to seriously argue that a mother who has her child killed
before her eyes is a plaintiff who does not deserve redress. Even the
opponents of the doctrine will, at times, concede this point. 6 A
meritorious plaintiff has suffered serious injury admittedly caused by
defendant's negligence. The situation is one in which almost everyone
instinctively feels that the plaintiff should recover. 7
72. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419
(1969). In the leading case refusing to adopt the Dillon doctrine, the New York court
nonetheless conceded that such concerns as proliferation of claims, fraud, and proof prob-
lems were not valid reasons to deny recovery. Instead, the court grounded its refusal to
adopt the doctrine on the problem of the scope of liability. The court asserted that logic
would extend liability beyond any reasonable limits: "Assuming that there are cogent
reasons for extending liability in favor of victims of shock resulting from injury to others,
there appears to be no rational way to limit the scope of liability." Id at 618, 301 N.Y.S.2d
at 561, 249 N.E.2d at 425.
73. Reaction to Dillon, supra note 4, at 1250. Accord, Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt.
116, 259 A.2d, 12, 15 (1969) ("Recovery must be brought within manageable dimensions").
74. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 749, 441 P.2d at 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
75. This latter criticism of the doctrine was most strongly enunciated in the majority
opinion in Amaya:
As Professor Prosser concedes, such limitations are quite arbitrary . .. but compel-
ling moral and socio-economic reasons . . . require that a negligent defendant's
liability have some stopping point. None has yet been proposed that would be fair
to all parties concerned, and the failings of the above quoted limitations suggest
that the quest may be an inherently fruitless one.
59 Cal. 2d at 313, 379 P.2d at 524, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 44. Accord, Jelly v. LaFlame, 108 N.H.
471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968).
76. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d at 615, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558, 249 N.E.2d at 422.
77. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 334.
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It is equally important to note that under conventional negligence
doctrine the plaintiff would recover. In general, the scope of
defendant's duty includes those foreseeable risks of harm caused by
the negligent conduct of the defendant. In this case, although not all
possible plaintiffs will be foreseeable, there are certainly some who
are. The notion that children in residential neighborhoods will be
supervised by a watching parent does not seem unreasonable. The idea
that such a watching parent will be severely upset, and perhaps even
that she will suffer physical injuries as a result, is also not so unusual
as to be unforeseeable to the negligent defendant. Given this, and in
the absence of other factors such as assumption of risk or other
defenses, under normal principles of negligence the plaintiff mother in
Dillon would recover."8
Before Dillon, the denial of the right of recovery of the mother was
due to a judicial limitation upon the normal functioning of tort prin-
ciples. It is suggested that general negligence rules embody the basic
policy that negligence on the part of the defendant, resulting in injury
to a foreseeable plaintiff, ought to be paid for by the defendant rather
than the plaintiff. Such a policy already includes massive limitations
upon plaintiffs recovery, because it excludes the numerous cases in
which the defendant caused a plaintiffs injury through mere accident,
or negligently caused injury to an unforeseeable plaintiff. These plain-
tiffs would have been compensated under earlier legal principles but
were excluded in the early nineteenth century with the rise of the in-
dustrial revolution and the accompanying development of the
negligence doctrine. 9
Consequently, the denial of recovery to a meritorious plaintiff in a
Dillon situation must be the result of a more limited duty beyond
regular foreseeability principles. Hence, a plaintiff who can prove all
the normal negligence elements is being denied recovery because of
additional judicially constructed limiting factors. To justify such
special limits on duty there should be a serious countervailing policy
requiring the limitation. The reason for such limitation is the fear that
the doctrine will prove uncontrollable. Unless this fear is justified,
such special limitations should not be imposed.
This understanding is important. Not only is the plaintiff
meritorious and able to meet all the normal requirements for recovery,
but she is also a plaintiff who, on the facts of her case, deserves to
78. Oliphant & Babbit, supra note 67, at 379.
79. See James, Analysis of the Origin and Development of the Negligence Actions,
reprinted in J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND (1975);
Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in The History of Torts, reprinted in J. O'CON-
NELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, NO-FAULT AND BEYOND (1975).
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recover. The denial of her claim rests not upon the problems in her
own case, but upon potential problems in future cases not before the
court.80
This is not to say that courts should turn a blind eye to potential
problems. As a conceptual approach, however, the right of recovery
should be extended as far toward allowing normal tort doctrines to
function as can reasonably be controlled by the courts, so that the
burden on defendants will not be impossibly great." The importance of
validating this conceptual approach lies in the fact that its logic has
escaped many of those who criticize the extension of the Dillon doc-
trine. Typical is the argument made by Laurence E. Oliphant, Jr. and
Harold W. Babbit, writing in the Insurance Counsel Journal.2 The
authors concede that under general negligence principles the plaintiff-
witness would recover:
[N]egligence analysis determines the scope of defendant's duty to a plain-
tiff in terms of foreseeability. That is, a defendant owes a duty of care to
all who might foreseeably be harmed by his negligent conduct. Thus, if a
defendant negligently hits a child with his automobile, it is perhaps
foreseeable that the child's mother will be in the area of the accident, will
see her child hit, and will suffer emotional trauma as a result.'
Oliphant and Babbit correctly perceive that various arbitrary lines
have been drawn by courts to limit recovery. They argue that the doc-
trine must be controlled and not be allowed to impose liability beyond
the collective ability of defendants to pay, since the imposition of
80. See note 63 supra.
81. This same approach has been used by the Supreme Court of California in reject-
ing the traditional categories of invitees, licensees, and trespassers in formulating the duty
owed by a land occupier for personal injuries suffered by a visitor to the premises. In
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968), the court noted
that special duty limiters had been created to protect the land occupier and owner from
the normal operation of tort principles. The reason suggested was reliance upon the
historical place of land in English and American law as it grew in response to feudalism.
Deciding that these special reasons were no longer applicable in light of changes in
American society, the court determined that regular negligence principles ought to apply.
While the posture of the plaintiff will certainly be a factor in establishing the range of
foreseeability of harm, it will not be the only factor. In a particular case many factors may
be material in demonstrating the scope of defendant's duty. Thus, the approach suggested
in this article seems consistent with the approach taken by the California Supreme Court
in other areas of the law. It is also noteworthy that in his dissenting opinion, Justice
Burke suggested that the decision would lead to unlimited liability. This is the same argu-
ment that is faced by the Dillon court. Indeed, it may be that this fear is expressed
almost any time that earlier special limited-duty rules are abandoned so that general tort
principles may function.
82. Oliphant & Babbit, supra note 67, at 379.
83. Id. at 381.
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massive liability would curtail socially useful activity of highway
transportation."4 So far so good. But the authors apparently see the use
of any arbitrary lines to limit recovery as unacceptable, arguing that it
must be all or nothing:
This is the primary fallacy of Dillon. Like the courts which broke away
from the "impact" rule, the Dillon court believed the prevailing rule to be
illogical and acted to correct it. Yet, it too, was compelled to offer
guidelines for future cases which would limit the liability imposed by a
strict application of negligence principles. Conceived as a blow against
contrivance and artifice, the Dillon decision concludes with artificial
distinctions of its own in its promulgation of rules for future cases.
As we have seen, to pursue legal logic in these cases is to pursue an il-
lusory goal. 5
Their main point is that Dillon is as artificial as the earlier rules and
therefore no recovery at all should be allowed. They would presumably
argue that no recovery should be allowed without impact to the plain-
tiff herself." Such a view fails to focus upon the fact that basic tort
principles are already designed to limit liability and under basic tort
principles the plaintiff in Dillon would recover. The policy of the
judiciary, then, should be to extend liability toward normal tort prin-
ciples as far as can reasonably be controlled. 7
Oliphant and Babbit are correct in that all the limitations which
courts have used, such as impact and zone of danger, are arbitrary.
Those limitations represent a step by step expansion toward the scope
of recovery which would be allowed by the normal workings of general
tort principles. Far from being a leap into the "fantastic realm of in-
finite liability,"88 the history of the doctrine is that of a cautious
growth back toward normal tort principles as the courts became con-
vinced that fears of runaway or overburdensome liability were
groundless. If forced to choose between an all or nothing approach
many courts will choose an absolute bar to recovery due to fear of the
unknown. 8 If courts may use a process of "controlled growth" it is likely
84. Id. at 379.
85. Id. at 384.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 382. Although the authors cite with approval the position of the court ex-
pressed in Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968), that the Dillon doctrine
would unreasonably burden highway users, they offer no reasons for their approval of
that position and no evidence that such a burden has actually manifested itself in the
years since the adoption of Dillon in California.
88. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 751, 441 P.2d at 928, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).89. In Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969), the
court conceded that the injury was serious and rejected the argument that problems of
fraud, proof, and excessive litigation, justified a denial of recovery. They refused to follow
Dillon, however, on the ground that unlimited liability would result. In a stinging dissent,
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that eventually general tort principles will be adopted."
The discredited impact requirement 9' was arbitrary since once there
was such an impact, plaintiff could recover for her emotional upset as
well.92 As courts grew less afraid of emotional distress even the most
absurd or technical impacts were allowed to justify recovery.9 Also ar-
bitrary are the "fear for self' and "zone of danger" rules. 9 These rules
marked a hesitant step by the courts in the direction of normal tort
doctrine. Each allows the inclusion of some additional meritorious
plaintiffs while retaining some arbitrary cut-off point to prevent
unlimited expansion. The arbitrary limit on liability created by every
intermediate rule allows courts the security of testing the doctrine
without losing all control over it. The earlier rules were further ex-
Judge Keating expressed dissatisfaction and puzzlement with the reasoning of the majority,
concluding that all the elements necessary for recovery were present in the case, and that
the majority's "unlimited liability" argument did not justify a denial of that recovery:
The majority opinion effectively demolishes every !egalism and every policy argu-
ment which would deny recovery to a mother who sustains mental and physical in-
juries caused by fear or shock, upon learning that her child has been killed or in-
jured in an accident. It has shown that every element necessary to build a case for
tortious liability in negligence is here present. There is an important interest worthy
of protection, there is proximate cause, there is injury, and there is foreseeability.
Yet, having shown all this, inexplicably, recovery is denied.
The rationalization for the result reached here is the supposed terror of
"unlimited liability." The characterization of this argument as a "rationalization"
may appear harsh but, nevertheless, it seems fully justified. Not one piece of
evidence is offered to prove that the "dollar-and-cents" problem will have the dire
effects claimed.
Id. at 619-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 562, 249 N.E.2d at 424-25 (Keating, J., dissenting).
90. Justice Keating's solution to unlimited liability would be to create limitations
upon bystander recovery on a case-by-case basis, using principles of proximate cause and
foreseeability as means of avoiding anomalous results. Justice Keating would also require
stringent evidence of causation and of actual injury in order to deter spurious claims. Id.
at 620-21, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 562-63, 249 N.E.2d at 425 (Keating, J., dissenting).
91. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 332.
92. See generally Reaction to Dillon, supra note 4, at 1248.
93. In his treatise on tort law, Professor Prosser elaborates upon some of the "in-
juries" which plaintiffs used to justify recovery:
"Impact" has meant a slight blow, a trifling burn or electric shock, a trival jolt or
jar, a forcible seating on the floor, dust in the eye, or the inhalation of smoke. The
requirement has even been satisfied by a fall brought about by a faint after a colli-
sion, or the plaintiffs own wrenching of her shoulder in reaction to the fright. "The
magic formula 'impact' is pronounced: the door opens to the full joy of a complete
recovery." A Georgia circus case has reduced the whole matter to a complete ab-
surdity by finding "impact" where the defendant's horse evacuated his bowels into
the plaintiffs lap.
PROSSER, supra note 4, at 331 (citations omitted).
94. In adopting the Dillon doctrine, the court in Toms v. McConnel, 45 Mich. App.
647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973) characterized the zone of danger rule as artificial and harsh.
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panded when, and only when, the courts became convinced through ex-
perience that the previous expansion had not proved to be too burden-
some.
This is the correct understanding of this area of tort law. The
special duty limitations which limit recovery by third parties for emo-
tional distress have no intrinsic significance. Rather, they are merely
arbitrary limits, a series of steps established to allow a gradual and
controllable experiment with more liberal rules of recovery. The steps
are rather like a series of locks, each gradually and cautiously raising a
ship toward the eventual goal of lifting the ship to the level of the sea
and allowing it to sail freely.
Of course, such a situation is not entirely "fair" to all plaintiffs. With
each rule (including the impact rule) some foreseeable plaintiffs, suffer-
ing emotional distress as a result of defendants' negligence, will be
precluded from recovering. This result cannot be denied. However,
each rule is more just than its predecessor because each allows more
meritorious plaintiffs to recover and denies recovery to fewer. This is,
at least, a movement in the right direction. It is hard to see how it can
be fairer to deny recovery to all meritorious plaintiffs rather than to
some. This is especially true when the judicial development in this
area shows a clear trend toward allowing recovery based upon general
tort principles. Although no mid-point in the chain of doctrinal develop-
ment is completely equitable, allowing the step-by-step development
seems to be the only way to permit the doctrine to grow. Courts must
be allowed to see, through experience, that runaway liability does not
result at one stage before they will feel comfortable in moving on to
the next.
It must be concluded then, that it is reasonable to erect arbitrary
barriers to recovery (duty definers) because that is the only way the
courts can be certain that they can control the scope of the doctrine.
Such controls are allowable in order to determine whether policy
needs require a continued application of rules more restrictive than
the general tort doctrine. On the other hand, such controls should be
relaxed in the direction of general tort principles, as the experience of
the courts with each set of controls indicates that the problems are not
serious and that the special limitations on duty are no longer
necessary.
IV. DILLON IN CALIFORNIA AND ELSEWHERE
In Dillon v. Legg,9 5 the California Supreme Court allowed recovery
by a mother who suffered physical injury caused by the emotional
95. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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distress of seeing the negligently caused death of her child even
though the mother was not in the zone of danger." In so doing, the
court took a bold step in the direction of bringing such cases into line
with general tort principles. Unfortunately, their explanation of their
action has led to widespread misunderstanding which leaves the doc-
trine open to attack by its opponents."
'The court noted that the plaintiffs case was a meritorious one, and
that the facts of the complaint would, under normal circumstances,
state a cause of action in negligence.98 The court correctly established
that in the absence of overriding policy considerations foreseeability of
risk is of primary importance in establishing the element of duty.99 Un-
fortunately, the court felt it necessary to appear to be destroying all
arbitrary limits on recovery and to be replacing them only with
general tort rules:
[W]e see no good reason why the general rules of tort law, including the
concepts of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability, long applied
to all other types of injury, should not govern the case now before us.
Any questions that the case raises "will be solved most justly by applying
general principles of duty and negligence, and ...mechanical rules of
thumb which are at variance with these principles do more harm than
good.""®
Such a view is, of course, correct. In the absence of overriding fear of
the uncontrollability of the doctrine, general tort principles should be
allowed to function. The history of the development of the doctrine, as
has been seen, has been a movement in this direction. If the court had
finally concluded that general negligence principles alone could be
trusted to govern the doctrine, its statement would have been
welcome.
It becomes apparent upon reviewing the Dillon decision that it is, in
reality, merely one more intermediate step. Initially, it should be noted
that the court refused to extend recovery for mental distress alone. In-
96. Dillon represents the classic factual pattern. A young child crossed the street
and was struck and killed by the automobile of the negligent defendant. There were two
plaintiffs, the sister and the mother of the deceased. Both actually witnessed the accident
and both suffered mental distress and shock to the nervous system resulting in both men-
tal and physical pain and suffering. The sister was close enough to the scene of the acci-
dent to have been within the zone of danger, but the mother, who was further away, was
clearly not in the zone of danger. Thus, the court was squarely faced with the question of
whether the few feet separating the sister and the mother would be enough to compel
denial of the mother's claim. If not, the zone of danger rule would have to fall.
97. See generally Oliphant & Babbit, note 67 supra.
98. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
99. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
100. 1d. at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
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stead, the court confined its holding to cases where physical injury
results from the mental distress. In such cases, recovery can be had
both for the physical injury and for the mental distress. 01 This require-
ment seems to be intended to limit the number of claims and to limit
recovery to the most serious ones. At the outset it can be seen that
the court erected its own set of "arbitrary" duty limiters by holding,
as a matter of law, that without physical injuries there will be no
recovery for mental distress."2 The court, however, went even further.
In regular tort cases one expects a number of factors to be considered
when deciding whether foreseeability exists. The absence of some fac-
tors is balanced by the particular strengtlr of others, and it is normally
left to a case-by-case determination as to whether a duty, governed by
foreseeability, has been demonstrated."3 This is not, however, the ap-
proach taken by the California Supreme Court.
In Dillon, three factors were articulated which determine the
presence of reasonable foreseeability."' Although the connection be-
tween the factors and the likelihood of foreseeability is clear, not
every case in which one of the factors is absent would truly be un-
foreseeable. For example," 5 in the lake country of Indiana it is
customary for children to play on paddle boards and small sailboats far
out on the lake for many hours at a time. It is also customary for
101. Although the issue was not directly raised in Dillon because the plaintiff-mother
did suffer physically as a result of the emotional distress, the California Supreme Court
subsequently held that physical injuries were a requirement for recovery. See Krouse v.
Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 77, 562 P.2d 1022, 1032, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 873 (1977), in which the
following jury instruction was approved:
Ordinarily the law does not permit recovery of damages for physical harm and
emotional distress caused by the knowledge of an injury or death of another per-
son.
However, if a plaintiff has suffered an emotional shock resulting in physical
harm which was proximately caused by the direct emotional impact from the con-
temporaneous observation of the immediate consequences of a negligent act which
was the proximate cause of injury or death to another person in a relationship such
as plaintiff bore to __ , then such a plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for
such physical harm, together with damages for emotional distress, if any.
CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS. Civil, No. 12.83 (Supp. Service, Phamphlet No. 2 1976). This doc-
trine is softened somewhat because "shock to the nervous system" is included among the
physical injuries. Id. at No. 12.80.
102. The court also made the recovery of the mother dependent upon liability of the
defendant to the child, stating that the defendant could raise against the mother any
defense he might have against the child. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 916,
69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
103. See note 90 supra.
104. See note 40 supra.
105. The author wishes to thank Mr. L. H. Joseph Jr. of Los Angeles, California for
suggesting this example.
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parents of such children to keep watch over their youngsters through
telescopes. This is well known to all users of the lake. Defendant,
knowing this, drives his motorboat negligently, running down a child
on a paddle board. The child is killed. The mother of the boy, watching
through a telescope, suffers emotional distress, shock and physical in-
juries. Because of the Dillon factor, which requires that plaintiff be
located close to the scene of the accident, plaintiff will not recover
although her injuries were real and the occurrence was clearly
foreseeable to the tortfeasor. Under general tort principles the plain-
tiff would probably recover, but not under Dillon.
The preceding illustrates that Dillon, despite its statements to the
contrary, has not completely allowed general tort principles to operate.
While moving in the direction of general tort doctrine, the case still
erects arbitrary barriers to recovery. Like past rules, this can only be
explained as a policy decision for loss shifting, used by the court to
control the scope of the doctrine. '
The Dillon court may not have intended such a narrow interpreta-
tion. The court spoke of the three factors as "guidelines which will aid
in the resolution of such an issue as the instant one." ' While holding
that the three factors would state a cause of action,' °8 the court did not
absolutely decree that the absence of one or more would require
dismissal. Interestingly, the three factors seem to have been taken as
absolute rules by most of the lower California courts.'" These courts
106. Since the majority in Dillon claimed to be adopting general negligence principles,
the dissent was able to attack the majority's holding on the basis that the three factors
adopted by the majority were arbitrary. Of course the dissent is correct; but as has been
noted, such arbitrary limitations are acceptable as intermediate steps in the growth of the
doctrine toward general tort liability. Each new step in expansion of the doctrine (and its
accompanying limitation) allows the court to test the fears of Dillon critics while keeping
the social policy balance. When it is seen that the new step does not result in an un-
balance or unfairness in practice, the next step can be tried. In that context the ar-
bitrariness of the guidelines can be admitted and justified. Unfortunately, the majority
claimed that only general tort principles were being employed, thereby allowing the dis-
sent to justifiably assert: "Upon analysis, [the guidelines] seeming certainty evaporates into
arbitrariness, an [sic] inexplicable distinctions appear." Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 747,
441 P.2d 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (Burke, J., dissenting). It must be stressed, however, that
both the zone of danger rule and the Dillon requirements are arbitrary limitations on duty,
yet the Dillon rule is closer to general tort principles, and is the better rule even though
it still is an intermediate step. As the majority noted, "the history of the cases does not
show the development of a logical rule but rather a series of changes and abandonments."
Id. at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
107. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
108. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
109. For discussions of the California decisions subsequent to Dillon, see WITKIN, note
4 supra, and Ten Years After, note 56 supra.
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have been extremely cautious about extending the doctrine beyond the
Dillon facts. The approach of these courts has generally been to focus
upon whether the particular facts meet the three factors rather than
deciding whether other factors exist which outweigh the absence of
one of them."O
It must be stressed that what is wrong with Dillon is not the courts'
continual need to place artificial limits on recovery. Rather, it is that
while placing these artificial limits upon recovery, the courts purport
to abandon all limits, thus leaving themselves open to criticism and
making it difficult to understand the actual process at work. This ap-
parent inconsistency has caused some commentators to assume incor-
rectly that the California Supreme Court failed to recognize the policy
elements in Dillon,"' thus making it more difficult to abandon the
three guidelines as they prove to be unnecessary for keeping
recoveries within socially manageable limits."2
110. Recovery has been denied in a number of cases, because of a failure to meet the
three Dillon guidelines. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1977) (plaintiffs were not involuntary witnesses to the events, and the medical
significance of the events was not understood until explained to plaintiffs by doctors);
Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977) (plaintiff arrived on the
scene five minutes after the accident); Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 868 (1974) (plaintiff saw the injured child thirty minutes after the accident); Jansen
v. Children's Hosp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973) (distress was caused over
a period of time rather than by a sudden accident); Deboe v. Horn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 226, 94
Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971) (plaintiff was summoned to hospital and told of injuries). By contrast,
in Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720
(1976), a foster mother was allowed to recover when, as the result of negligent medical
treatment performed in her presence, her child became spastic, convulsed, and died in her
arms. The court went to great lengths to show that the plaintiff herself acted as the
child's mother and was treated as such. In each case, the presence or absence of facts
fulfilling the three factors was seen as dispositive. Significantly, Associate Justice Thomp-
son, writing the opinion in Mobaldi, saw the issue as "primarily the construction of the
guidelines of Dillon v. Legg." Id. at 576, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 722. Justice Thompson seemed
clearly to understand that Dillon retains policy limitations on duty, explaining that
"Dillon imposes its own court-developed standard characterized as foreseeability, which
limits the scope of liability." Id. at 581, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
111. See, e.g., Oliphant & Babbit, supra note 67, at 384 ("For in its preoccupation with
legal logic Dillon fails to perceive the fundamental problem in this area of the law-strik-
ing the proper balance between the injured person and the person who must pay").
112. One of the most interesting struggles involving possible modifications of the
guidelines has been waged around the issue of whether a mother, who arrives on the
scene soon after her child's injury and suffers injury herself, may recover. The facts in-
volved two of the three Dillon factors-the requirement that plaintiff be located near the
scene of the accident and the requirement that the injury be caused by a contemporary
sensory impact. In Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, hear-
ing denied (1969), a thirteen year old boy purchased gunpowder from defendant which ex-
ploded and caused the boy serious injury. Within moments the mother arrived and suf-
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fered severe emotional and physical shock. The court ruled that observing the injuries
within moments after the explosion met the Dillon requirement that the plaintiff be
located near the scene of the accident. The court also held that the mother was not re-
quired to have actually witnessed the injury-causing event. Rather, the injury to the
plaintiff must be reasonably contemporaneous with the injury to the child, as contrasted
with an injury caused by plaintiffs being told of the child's injury at a later time. The
cause of the mother's injury was the witnessing of her child's injury which meets the
"sensory impact" element. Although the opinion attempted to demonstrate that the three
factors were not met, it is clear that the case goes beyond the Dillon guidelines. The sec-
ond factor requires that "the shock [must result] from a direct emotional impact upon
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident." Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. Yet, in Archibald, the acci-
dent itself was never observed; only the results were witnessed. Therefore, unlike Dillon,
the negligent event does not have to be observed, nor does the event which caused the in-
jury have to be present in the Archibald criteria. Of course, if the California factors were
mere guidelines as the California Supreme Court indicated, then Archibald was correctly
decided. Although one factor was not met the court believed, in light of the facts of the
case (including the speedy arrival on the scene and the horrible sight which greeted the
mother upon her arrival) a cause of action had been stated. Since we know, however, that
the factors have generally been treated as absolute duty limiters, it is instructive to see
how the Archibald case has been treated by later California decisions. In Powers v.
Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974), the court declined to grant recovery to
parents suffering mental distress when they arrived at the hospital to which their
injured child had been taken 30 to 60 minutes after the accident. Interestingly enough,
the court did not cite Archibald. In Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr.
619 (1977), where the child was struck by a car and the parents arrived at the scene of the
accident within five minutes, the court denied recovery. After reviewing the rele-
vant cases the court concluded that the accident had not been observed, only the
aftermath. In part, the Arauz court based its analysis on Jansen v. Children's Hosp.
Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973), which suggested that
in Archibald, the mother had heard the explosion, thus giving her a contemporaneous sen-
sory observation of it. Although there is no evidence in Archibald that such an event ac-
tually took place, later courts seem to need to force Archibald back within the limits of
the three factors and, in the process, demonstrate that the guidelines are considered ab-
solute duty limiters. The lack of evidence for believing that the mother heard the explo-
sion has been pointed out by commentators on many occasions. See, e.g., Simons, supra
note 4, at 34. Two recent cases demonstrate the lengths to which courts have gone to
make demands of justice square with these holdings. In so doing some errors have been
made. In Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978), where
the child drowned in a swimming pool, there was a triable issue of fact on the mother's
claim for mental distress under Dillon. The mother had been out searching for her child
when she heard a cry from rescuers who pulled the child from the pool. She then ran to
the pool. Significantly, the mother pleaded that when she heard the cry of the
rescuer-she "immediately had the dreadful knowledge" of what had taken place. Id. at
559, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 659. Clearly, the pleadings were an attempt to slip between the
traps set by the earlier cases for such situations. If she suffered her injury only when she
saw her child she risked running afoul of Arauz. If her injury was caused by seeing the
deterioration of her child, she would be barred by Jansen. Only by hearing the yell and
formulating a picture of the accident could she hope for recovery. The decision in favor of
the mother was certainly correct since she was in the area, arrived on the scene almost
immediately, and suffered harm from seeing the immediate aftermath of the accident.
Under Archibald, without the perplexing Jansen interpretation, she would certainly have
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Dillon was the first modern case to allow such recovery."' While ex-
panding liability toward that which would be allowed by general tort
principles, the court felt it necessary to retain some measure of control
in case the doctrine proved to be more uncontrollable than anticipated.
Although the court dismissed the notion that the doctrine would result
in a massive increase of litigation, fraud, proof problems, and socially
undesirable consequences, the court had no prior history upon which to
rely. Because the court could not be absolutely certain that the expan-
sion was wise, it retained a braking mechanism as a hedge against er-
ror. It is only now, eleven years after the adoption of the doctrine, that
commentators can write with some degree of certainty that the doc-
trine has not produced the feared problems and that the California
court was right. "
It is profitable to compare and contrast the California experience
with that of Hawaii. With some experience in watching the California
experiment, the Supreme Court of Hawaii concluded that recovery in a
Dillon situation could safely be allowed. The fight goes on, however,
between those who believe that all artificial barriers should fall, allow-
ing general tort doctrine to function, and those who still believe that
some special duty limiters are required to control the scope of liability.
In the first two decisions, Leong v. Takasaki' 5 and Rodrigues v.
recovered. Yet, having accepted the notion that the mother in Archibald heard the explo-
sion, the plaintiff and the court were forced into a quagmire of absurdity, despite a proper
result. Not so fortunate were the plaintiffs in Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d
506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495, hearing denied (1978). Two children rode home with a family
friend from an outing while their parents followed directly behind in their car. The first
car went out of control, crashed, and killed the children. The second car carrying the
parents rounded a corner and came upon the accident "before the dust settled." Id. at 509,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 496. Unfortunately, the plaintiff could not claim to have seen or heard
the accident. The result was that plaintiffs claim did not state a cause of action. The court
accepted the "heard the explosion" rationale of Archibald. The result in Parsons is truly
shocking and can only be explained as part of a tortured process to force all of the Califor-
nia cases, including Archibald, into a strict reading of the Dillon factors. The probable
reason for this is that courts fear that any expansion beyond the factors would lead to
unlimited liability. The California courts have not been able to formulate a rule which
would control the doctrine while allowing more equitable results to plaintiffs such as
those in Parsons. The Massachusetts court, on the other hand, has devised such a rule. In
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978), recovery was extended in situations
where the plaintiff arrives at the scene of the accident while the child is still there. While
still arbitrary, this rule provides more equitable results in many cases and is probably
easier to administer than the current California case law on this point. This author hopes
that California will adopt Dziokonski as more in the spirit of Archibald than the later
cases which have tried to explain the case.
113. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 324.
114. See, e.g., Liability to the Bystander, note 4 supra; Reaction to Dillon, note 4
supra.
115. 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
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State,"6 the Supreme Court of Hawaii pushed beyond Dillon. Chief
Justice Richardson attempted to firmly ground such cases in the
mainstream of traditional tort theory.1 1 7
In Leong a child sued for emotional distress caused by watching a
step-grandmother killed by a negligently driven car. The court first
recognized that the definition of duty was a policy decision. " 8 While
noting the standard objections to granting such relief, the court re-
jected them and held that "the trend is a hesitant abandonment of
such artificial restrictions and barriers to recovery in favor of a
greater reliance on general tort law principles and the contemporary
sophistication of the medical profession to test the veracity of the
claims for relief.""' 9 Having said this, the Hawaii court rejected many
of the policy limitations in Dillon. The court rejected as illogical the
notion that emotional harm must cause physical injuries in order to
permit recovery. It recognized that such a requirement is merely an
artificial device designed to limit fraudulent claims which often limited
116. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
117. Rodrigues involved emotional distress sustained by a plaintiff who had witnessed
his property being negligently damaged. The court first noted the policy basis for denying
recovery, stating that "the proposition that the interest in freedom from the negligent in-
fliction of mental distress has in fact been protected whenever the courts were persuaded
that the dangers of fraudulent claims and undue liability of the defendant were outweighed
by assurances of "genuine and serious mental distress." Id. at 170, 472 P.2d at 519. After
expressing the belief that "the preferable approach is to adopt general standards to test
the genuineness and seriousness of mental distress in any particular case," Id. at 171, 472
P.2d at 519, the court concluded that there is a general duty to refrain from inflicting
serious mental distress through negligent conduct:
It can no longer be said that the advantages gained by the courts in administering
claims of mental distress by reference to narrow categories outweigh the burden
thereby imposed on the plaintiff. We recognize that the interest in freedom from
negligent infliction of serious mental distress is entitled to independent legal pro-
tection. We hold, therefore, that there is a duty to refrain from the negligent inflic-
tion of serious mental distress."
Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520. The court, therefore, allowed recovery for mental distress
alone, a result which the California courts have been unwilling to reach. Moreover, the
court in Rodrigues not only permitted recovery based upon damage to property, but also
failed to require the three Dillon factors. In place of these arbitrary limitations, the court
stated that "the question of whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in any par-
ticular case will be solved most justly by the application of general tort principles." Id. In-
terestingly, one limit still remained. The court defined liability in terms of the foreseeable
plaintiff as follows: "serious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man, nor-
mally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered
by the circumstances of the case." Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520. This formulation would
seem to deny recovery to the eggshell plaintiff although, in most jurisdictions, such a
plaintiff will recover. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 261.
118. 55 Hawaii at 407, 520 P.2d at 764.
119. Id. at 403, 520 P.2d at 762.
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genuine ones as well.12 ° The court also apparently rejected the three
Dillon factors as unnecessary, and alternatively relied upon general
negligence principles as personified by the "reasonable person" stan-
dard. The key question, according to Chief Justice Richardson, was
whether a reasonable person would be expected to cope with the men-
tal stress engendered by the circumstances.121
The California factors were not used in Rodrigues and Leong as ar-
bitrary duty limiters. Rather, many factors were considered in order to
determine whether plaintiff's inability to cope with the distress caused
by defendant's negligence was reasonable. For example, the court in
Leong discussed the particular nature of the relationship between the
plaintiff and the step-grandmother, as well as the history of the ex-
tended family in Hawaii, which made the plaintiffs reaction to the
events reasonable.122 In other situations in which no close relationship
between the bystander and the primary victim exists, other factors
may exist, and liability may or may not be found, depending upon the
nature of those other factors. The key is that all factors will be con-
sidered, not just a carefully selected few.
In Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd.,'23 an unusual factual pat-
tern tested the court's commitment to its Leong view-that all ar-
bitrary limits could now safely be abolished in favor of general tort
principles. The employee of one of the defendants124 drove a truck
120. Id. at 404, 520 P.2d at 763 ("the requirement of resulting physical injury is
employed as yet another of the artificial devices to guarantee the genuineness of the
claim, which may actually foreclose relief to a genuine claim").
121. Id. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765. According to the Supreme Court of Hawaii, the entire
foreseeability approach, including the Dillon guidelines, was another variant of the zone of
danger formulation. Rather than adopt this standard, the court chose to follow an ap-
proach to liability based upon normal principles of proximate cause:
We now hold that when it is reasonably foreseeable that a reasonable plaintiff-
witness to an accident would not be able to cope with the mental stress engendered
by such circumstances, the trial court should conclude that defendant's conduct is
the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury and impose liability on the defendant for
any damages arising from the consequences of his negligent act.
The courts in Dillon, D'Ambra, and Boardman tested the defendant's duty to
the plaintiff on foreseeability standards rather than on a proximate cause standard.
Hence their criteria, the proximity of the plaintiff-witness to the accident, the man-
ner in which he witnessed it or learned of it, his relationship to the victim and the
foreseeability of his and the victim's presence to the defendant should not be
employed by a trial court to bar recovery but should at most be indicative of the
degree of mental stress suffered.
Id. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765-66.
122. Id. at 410-11, 520 P.2d at 766.
123. 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
124. The accident took place because of brakes which failed. Defendants included the
company that owned and operated the truck; the manufacturer of the truck; the lessor of
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which struck another vehicle, resulting in the deaths of Frances and
her child Kailani, as well as serious injury to her other daughter. A
relative of Frances called Mr. Kelley, who resided in California, to tell
him that his daughter and grandchild were dead and that his other
grandchild had been horribly injured. Within an hour or so Mr. Kelley
began experiencing chest pains; he died of a heart attack shortly
thereafter.'25 In the subsequent wrongful death action, plaintiffs con-
tended that Mr. Kelley's death was a consequence of severe mental
distress caused by his being informed of the terrible accident. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the
plaintiffs appealed."'
The majority recognized that duty is a policy decision,'27 and that
the problem in all such cases is to delineate the scope of the duty
which will be allowed.'28 It was clear to the court that if Mr. Kelley
could recover, the doctrine would have no limit. Conceivably, allowing
recovery in this situation could eventually lead to recovery by Mr.
Kelley's wife, a neighbor, or anyone else who was told of the accident.
The court decided, therefore, that the complete extension of liability
had been premature, and that some rule limiting the scope of liability
would have to be formulated."
Speaking through Mr. Justice Kobayashi, the majority distinguished
Leong by noting that the circumstances of that case required no
special limitations upon liability, other than the requirement that the
mental distress be "serious." In Kelley, on the other hand, it was ob-
vious that some additional limitation was necessary in order to avoid
the "unmanageable, unbearable and totally unpredictable liability" that
would result from permitting plaintiff to recover.'3' The court therefore
concluded that since Mr. Kelley's location from the scene of the acci-
dent was so remote, the defendants could not reasonably foresee the
consequences to him. Thus, the court held that the duty of care enun-
ciated in Rodriques and Leong applies only to those plaintiffs who both
meet the standards set forth in those two cases and were located
within a reasonable distance from the scene of the accident.'3'
the trailer; a mechanic who worked on the truck; the estate of the deceased truck driver;
the company which inspected the truck; and the city, county and state in which the acci-
dent took place. I& at 205, 532 P.2d at 674.
125. Id. at 206, 532 P.2d at 674-75.
126. Id. at 205, 532 P.2d at 674.
127. Id. at 207, 532 P.2d at 675.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 208-09, 532 P.2d at 676.
130. Id. at 209, 532 P.2d at 676.
131. Id.
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The Hawaii cases provided a fascinating insight into the policy con-
siderations inherent to this area of tort law. These cases also provide
strong support for the position espoused by this article, because it is
recognized that the question of whether the doctrine should be extended
rests upon whether a given extension will result in unlimited and
unreasonable liability.13 The implication is that the proper direction is
toward extension. Short of that, it is proper to use arbitrary limits on
liability as a device to control the scope of the doctrine if that is
necessary to allow the maximum number of meritorious plaintiffs to
recover.
Interestingly, this same process of extension and debate continues
at each stage. Although the holding in Kelley is somewhat unclear, the
most conservative reading of the case is that the court has adopted the
three factors of Dillon as control devices. Even if so interpreted, the
Hawaii court's rule is still broader than Dillon's because, unlike Dillon,
mental distress alone may be compensated, and the distress can be the
product of damage to property as well as injury to another person.
The rule established in Kelley may be much broader than the Dillon
rule, since it is unclear whether the three Dillon factors were adopted
in their entirety by the Kelley court. The majority in Kelley requires
that plaintiff be near the scene of the accident, and also that the plain-
tiff meet the Leong standards. The key problem is to determine exactly
what the Kelley court meant when it referred to the Leong "stan-
dards." In Leong, the court had stated:
We now hold that when it is reasonably foreseeable that a reasonable
plaintiff-witness to an accident would not be able to cope with the mental
distress engendered by such circumstances, the trial court should con-
clude that defendant's conduct is the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury
and impose liability on the defendant for any damages arising from the
consequences of his negligent act. 33
Crucial to understanding the rule adopted in Kelley is the question of
whether the status of the plaintiff as a witness is one of the standards
which future plaintiffs must meet. If it is, then it seems that the "con-
temporaneous sensory impact" requirement of Dillon has been built into
the rule in Kelley. Further, since some close relationship will always
be required between the victim and the witness in order to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the plaintiff-witness's reaction
132. The court in Kelley expressed this concern of creating unreasonable liability as
follows: "However, while this duty exists, the problem of the delineation of the scope of
the duty (the question as to which particular plaintiffs, proximate-wise to the scene of the
accident, is the duty owed) remains for resolution." Id. See also Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
133. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii at 410, 520 P.2d at 765.
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(although not necessarily a relation of blood), such an interpretation
would, for all practical purposes, mean that the Dillon factors had been
adopted in Kelley.
It seems unlikely that the requirement that plaintiff be a witness is
one of those standards. If it were, Kelley would have been decided on
that basis, and there would have been no reason for the court to con-
struct additional requirements to exclude the California plaintiffs.
More likely, Leong requires that the plaintiff suffer severe distress,
determined by whether or not a reasonable person would be able to
cope with the distress."' Kelley requires that the plaintiff so affected
be located within a "reasonable" distance from the scene of the acci-
dent. '3 These requirements, when read together, would seem to in-
clude a plaintiff who arrived on the scene some time after the accident
or who suffered the distress upon being told of the accident later as
long as she had been nearby at the time. 36
Although Hawaii may not be ready to abandon all specially crafted
judicial controls on the doctrine, the rules that have been adopted in
that state move beyond Dillon and aid in the progression of the law
toward normal tort principles. Because the controlling rules are ex-
pressed more generally than in California, it may be easier to abandon
them as the court becomes convinced that such rules are no longer
necessary and that normal tort principles can act to control the doc-
trine without other special rules designed to limit duty.'37
134. Id.
135. Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii at 209, 532 P.2d at 676.
136. The Dillon requirements would preclude recovery in these situations.
137. The duty-foreseeability analysis used by the California courts springs from the
majority opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), in
which Justice Cardozo focused upon whether it was foreseeable that defendant's negligent
conduct would harm the plaintiff. In Cardozo's view, if the plaintiff was not foreseeable, it
followed that no duty could exist to the plaintiff and, therefore, defendant's conduct could
not be negligent toward her. The proximate cause analysis present in the Hawaii cases
espoused by Chief Justice Richardson in his Leong and Kelley opinions is represented by
Judge Andrews' dissenting opinion in Palsgraf. That view holds that if the defendant's
negligent conduct could reasonably be expected to cause harm to anyone, then a duty ex-
ists to the entire world to refrain from such conduct. Any limitations upon recovery are
policy decisions on loss shifting and nothing more.
Conceptually, the Andrews approach would appear to be more society-oriented; it per-
mits society to disapprove of wrongful conduct by branding that conduct as negligent,
even though the defendant is not required to compensate the victim because of a policy
decision that the chain of causation will be followed only so far. This result is quite dif-
ferent from the Cardozo view, which concludes that if the victim is not foreseeable, the
conduct is not wrongful (negligent) as to that victim.
In addition, the two theories place the burden of liability control upon different parts of
the legal system. Duty is generally defined as a matter of law, and a court, in setting the
scope of that duty, has the opportunity to predict the effect of the definition upon future
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A more restrictive approach was taken by the Federal District
Court for the District of Rhode Island in D'Ambra v. United States.13
In that case, the plaintiff-mother heard the impact of a mail truck
striking her son and saw the child slip under the front wheels of the
vehicle. Chief Judge Pettine determined that the issue of recovery for
emotional distress from viewing the negligently caused injury to
another had not been decided in the state and proceeded to consider
resolution of the issue.'39 Judge Pettine noted the essential merit in
plaintiff's claim, 4 ' and rejected many of the classic objections to the
doctrine.' He recognized that the key issue in the consideration of the
cases and to create additional artificial barriers as liability limiters. Over-cautious courts
may be prone to excessive zeal in restricting duty out of fear of the possible future exten-
sion of liability. The result of this could be to deny recovery to meritorious plaintiffs. Proxi-
mate cause, on the other hand, is usually determined by the trier of fact, and is not
susceptible to being defined in terms of an absolute rule. Thus, under the proximate cause
analysis, particular decisions may be more responsive to the equities involved in a par-
ticular case, without establishing a binding rule for future cases in which the factual
nuances are different.
In his dissenting opinion in Kelley, Chief Justice Richardson argued that if an interest
such as the right to be free from emotional distress is deemed to be entitled to protection,
courts should not interfere with the normal workings of tort law by imposing judicially
created rules and duty limiters. Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii at
211-13, 532 P.2d at 677-78 (Richardson, C.J., dissenting). This reasoning may have been
motivated by Justice Richardson's belief that the majority's holding in Kelley interfered
with the normal working of the litigation process, and that future meritorious plaintiffs
will be deprived of a remedy unnecessarily. It is quite possible that the jury, after hear-
ing the evidence in Kelley, would have concluded that the injury was not the proximate
result of the defendant's negligence. Further, the jury may have concluded that there was
no severe mental distress as required by the Leong decision, and thus recovery would
have been denied under that theory. In either case, the plaintiffs would not have
recovered, and the need for the appellate court's creation of artificial barriers to recovery
would have been obviated.
The approach actually applied by the majority seems to combine elements of both the
duty-proximate cause and foreseeability theories, since the court speaks in terms of duty
being a policy issue with no reference to foreseeability, while also referring to duty and
its connection with proximate cause. It is possible that the majority reacted too strongly
to its view of the equities involved in the Kelley case, as well as to their own fear that no
mechanism existed in the duty-proximate cause approach to control the scope of recovery.
In any event, it is unfortunate that the experiment with the Andrews approach was cut
short in Hawaii-a longer period of time in which to compare the development of the doc-
trine in the context of California's foreseeability approach with its development under
Justice Richardson's duty-proximate cause approach would have been instructive to
everyone who is struggling to understand the judicial Janus of duty and causation.
138. 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I.), modified on other grounds, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
139. Id. at 815.
140. Id. at 818 (quoting Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260, 264
(1920-21).
141. Id. Fraud, for example, was one of these objections which was quickly rejected.
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doctrine was whether it could be controlled.'42 His opinion validated
the approach of drawing arbitrary lines to circumscribe the scope of
the doctrine when the court feels that it is necessary to do so in order
to allow as many meritorious plaintiffs as possible to recover.'
Although the court essentially adopted the Dillon doctrine in allow-
ing plaintiff to recover, Judge Pettine expressed concern that the
Dillon factors might not confine the doctrine sufficiently to avoid
unlimited liability. He, therefore, adopted a somewhat more cautious
approach, concluding that while the experience in California did not
justify the fears of unlimited liability, and although no major problems
had been observed in the jurisdictions which had adopted the doctrine,
some limitation upon the scope of duty was needed in addition to those
already employed by the California Supreme Court. In Dillon, the
court had held that the prcsence of the mother near her child was
foreseeable as a matter of law.' The district court in D'Ambra was
not prepared to go that far:
[T]his Court, unlike the court in Tobin, believes that the criteria set forth
in Dillon for evaluating the foreseeability of the injury sufficiently serve
to define the parameters of the cause of action, with one additional pre-
requisite-that the presence of the parent must also be foreseeable.
This court deviates from the rule of Dillon in that it does not think that
the presence of the parent can be presumed. Rather, a foreseeability
analysis is necessary, ...145
Judge Pettine went on to establish a series of factors which could be
used to determine the foreseeability of the presence of the witness, in-
cluding the age of the primary victim, the neighborhood involved, the
familiarity of the tortfeasor with the area, and the time of the injury.4 '
Significantly, however, the court avoided turning guidelines into rigid
rules by creating a fifth factor to include "all other circumstances
which would have put the tortfeasor on notice of the likely presence of
a parent."'47
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified the
question of liability to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Speaking
through Justice Doris, the Rhode Island court then held that the
mother was entitled to recover. 48 In its analysis the court wrestled
142. Id. The court noted that problems of disproportionate and burdensome liability
really rested upon whether the doctrine could be adequately limited in scope.
143. Id at 819.
144. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 738, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
145. D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. at 819.
146. Id at 820.
147. Id.
148. D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975). The question cer-
tified to the Rhode Island court was as follows:
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with the concept of "foreseeability"'49 and decided that it was too
vague a concept upon which to base a decision. 150 Instead the court
focused on policy aspects, noting the merit in the parent's claim and
the seriousness of the injury that had occurred. Although not ready to
state broad rules of foreseeability, the court acknowledged that
"where a mother actually witnessed the death of her child, the
resulting mental distress can hardly be deemed so fantastic or freakish
as to make imposition of liability a moral outrage. '151 The court found
that the closeness of the relationship between mother and child
outweighed the negligent tortfeasor's inability to foresee her presence
in every case. The additional limiting factor of foreseeability of
presence, suggested in the district court opinion, was rejected. 152
Curiously, the mother's recovery seems to be a special exception to the
zone of danger rule which may, otherwise, have been left
undisturbed. 53 While approving the zone of danger theory, the court
created confusion by also stating that the Dillon requirements of loca-
tion and contemporaneous sensory impact constituted the zone of
danger rule. This anomaly casts doubt upon the court's holding.'54
May a non-negligent plaintiff mother, who is foreseeably in the vicinity of her
minor child but not in the child's zone of danger, recover damages for mental and
emotional harm accompanied by physical symptoms, caused by observing the death
of her child resulting exclusively from the negligence of defendant in driving the
truck which struck the child, although she suffered no physical impact?
Id at 646, 338 A.2d at 525-26.
149. The court declined to adopt either the Cardozo view or the Andrews view
although expressing some preference for the former as a more "functional approach." Id.
at 649, 333 A.2d at 527.
150. Id. at 650, 338 A.2d at 528 ("Given the wide disparity . . . between what courts
have found to be 'foreseeable' when faced with actual negligence problems, any strong
reliance on this concept as a device to distinguish close factual patterns would seem to be
misplaced").
151. Id. at 654, 338 A.2d at 529. This discussion is consistent with the majority's
underlying position that the basic issue for the courts in delineating the scope of the duty
is to determine who should bear the loss. Id. at 648, 338 A.2d at 527.
152. Id. at 656-57 n.7, 338 A.2d at 531 n.7.
153. Id. at 657, 338 A.2d at 531 ("If this relaxation of the zone-of-danger limitations on
liability is viewed as the exception and not the rule, we do not find the administrative dif-
ficulties posed by bystander recovery to be insurmountable").
154. Justice Kelleher, who concurred in a separate opinion, seemed similarly puzzled
as to the basis of the decision:
While the Chief Justice and my brothers Paolino and Doris discuss the issue
presented to us in terms of foreseeability, their ultimate conclusion seems to rest
upon a variety of moral, economic, and administrative policy considerations. I use
the word "seems" advisedly. My doubt as to the actual underpinnings of their opin-
ion is the cause for this particular literary effort.
Id. at 658, 338 A.2d at 532 (Kelleher, J., concurring). Justice Kelleher went on to argue
that foreseeability was the proper approach and that the doctrine should be adopted with
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Apparently, Rhode Island, in D'Ambra, adopted the most hesitant
step beyond the zone of danger rule. It seems possible that other ex-
tensions of the Dillon doctrine could follow when other compelling fac-
tors warrant, especially in light of the court's refusal to establish
general rules for the doctrine and the court's justification for extension
of the doctrine by focusing upon the particularly compelling nature of
the mother-child relationship. It will be interesting to observe whether
recovery in D'Ambra represents only a narrow exception to older tort
rules or whether it represents an experimental step, leading to more
general recovery once the court realizes that a broader rule can be
controlled.
Recently, Massachusetts joined the growing ranks of jurisdictions
adopting some varient of the Dillon doctrine. In Dziokonski v.
Babineau,'5 a mother suffered physical injury from mental distress
caused by seeing her injured daughter at the scene of the accident in
which her child had been negligently run down."' The Massachusetts
court reviewed and rejected the impact rule, overruling Spade v. Lynn
& Boston Railroad'7 in the process. Further, in considering and reject-
ing the zone of danger rule, the court refused to adopt a rule which
"absolutely denies recovery to every parent for whatever negligently
caused, emotionally based physical injuries result from his concern
over the safety of or injury to his injured child." '
In rejecting the zone of danger rule the court noted the classic ob-
jections to the doctrine but focused its discussion upon the issue of
unlimited liability. While admitting that the zone of danger rule allows
easy administration, the court also recognized that the rule un-
necessarily cuts off many foreseeable plaintiffs." 9
the special duty limiters articulated in both Dillon and the district court's opinion in
D'Ambra. Id. at 658, 338 A.2d at 531 (Kelleher, J., concurring).
155. 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978).
156. Id. at 1296. The case went beyond Dillon factually, and it is unclear whether the
facts in Dziokonski would have even stated a cause of action under Archibald v. Braver-
man, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, hearing denied (1969), a California case
which permitted a post-accident witness recovery. See note 112 supra.
157. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
158. 380 N.E.2d at 1299.
159. Id. at 1300. The court acknowledged that the zone of danger rule is commendable
to the extent that it permits a relatively easy determination of the persons who might
recover for emotionally-caused bodily injury, but concluded that the rule is an "inadequate
measure of the reasonable foreseeability of the possibility of physical injury resulting
from a parent's anxiety arising from harm to his child." Id. In the court's view, the
reasonable foreseeability of such a physical injury to a parent cannot turn on whether
that parent was or was not a reasonable prospect for a contemporaneous injury because
of the defendant's negligent conduct. For that reason, the Dziokonski court concluded that
the zone of danger rule "lacks strong logical support." Id.
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Agreeing with Dillon that foreseeability is the key to defining
duty,"0 the court also reasoned that some limiting factors were
necessary to avoid granting recovery to an overly broad class of poten-
tial plaintiffs.'61 The court acknowledged the role played by the Dillon
factors in regulating the scope of liability,6 ' and while these three
factors were referred to with approval, it is not clear whether they
were adopted." 3 Instead the court formulated a somewhat more liberal
rule that seemed to incorporate both Dillon and Archibald but did not
confine the factors which may be used to demonstrate the requisite duty.
At the same time an artificial barrier was maintained to allow con-
tinued judicial control:
[W]e conclude that the allegations concerning a parent who sustains
substantial physical harm as a result of severe mental distress over some
peril or harm to his minor child caused by the defendant's negligence
state a claim for which relief might be granted, where the parent either
witnesses the accident or soon comes on the scene while the child is still
there.'64
While it is impossible to know how restrictively later courts will inter-
pret this concise formulation by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, 6 ' that court may be showing the way in the develop-
ment of a doctrine controlled by general tort principles. The varied ap-
proaches undertaken by all of the courts grappling with this area of
tort law demonstrate the step-by-step movement toward allowing
recovery to be based upon general tort principles and the intermediate
160. Id. at 1302 ("it is reasonably foreseeable that, if one negligently operates a motor
vehicle so as to injure a person, there will be one or more persons sufficiently attached
emotionally to the injured person that he or they will be affected").
161. Id.
162. Id. The court reasoned that "[lit does not matter in practice whether these fac-
tors are regarded as policy considerations imposing limitations on the scope of reasonable
foreseeability . . . or as factors bearing on the determination of reasonable foreseeability
itself." Id. This reasoning was applied by the court in concluding that "in cases of this
character, such factors are relevant in measuring the limits of liability for emotionally
based injuries resulting from a defendant's negligence." Id-
163. The court enumerated the factors relevant to the imposition of liability as
follows:
In cases of this character, there must be both a substantial physical injury and proof
that the injury was caused by the defendant's negligence. Beyond this, the deter-
mination whether there should be liability for the injury sustained depends on a
number of factors, such as where, when, and how the injury to the third person
entered into the consciousness of the claimant, and what degree there was of
familial or other relationship between the claimant and the third person.
Id. (citation to Dillon omitted and emphasis supplied).
164. Id.
165. We do not know, for example, whether the doctrine is liiited to parent and child.
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device of using arbitrary duty limiters. 6 Extension of the doctrine can
166. In Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973), where the court
allowed an action by a mother who saw her child struck and killed by defendant's
negligently driven truck, the court squarely confronted the charge that the rules of
recovery might be arbitrary: "Where the interests of justice require, the courts of this
State have never been timorous in promulgating rules, albeit artibrary, to meet the situa-
tion presented." Id. at 654, 207 N.W.2d at 144. Interestingly, while validating the ap-
proach of controlling the doctrine through the use of arbitrary rules stopping somewhere
short of general tort principles, this is not the approach the court actually used. There
was no explicit adoption of the Dillon court's three factors and while noting that the case
before it involved the actual witnessing of the accident by the mother plaintiff, the court
declined to establish general rules to limit liability. Instead, the court reasoned as follows:
We note at the outset that devising one hard and fast rule for limiting bystander
recovery in mental suffering cases would be difficult and complex if not impossible.
However, we need not and indeed should not attempt to pose and solve a myriad of
hypothetical factual situations relative to cases of this nature which may or may
not arise in the future. The problem of limiting liability will be best surmounted
and will be more justly resolved for all concerned by treating each case on its own
individual facts.
Id. at 655, 207 N.W.2d at 144-45. The issue has continued to be a source of conflict in the
Michigan Court of Appeals. In Perlmutter v. Whitney, 60 Mich. App. 268, 230 N.W.2d 390
(1975), the defendant negligently crashed his car, injuring his young passenger. The court
denied a cause of action by the parents of the injured youngster for mental distress caused
by concern for their child, because the distress was not caused from witnessing the acci-
dent. The parents were not on the scene or in the area, and they suffered over the course
of time as they cared for the child. In a restrictive holding, the court declared that only if
the parents actually witnessed the accident could they recover. In Gustafson v. Faris, 67
Mich. App. 363, 241 N.W.2d 208 (1976), the court denied recovery to the mother of a
young child struck by a car. In so doing, however, the court rejected the rule in Perlmut-
ter as .too restrictive, reasoning as follows:
It would seem that there could be no argument that a rule which allows recovery
for emotional suffering and resulting physical injury to a mother who witnesses the
death of her child, but would deny recovery for emotional suffering and resulting
physical injury to a mother who does not witness the death of her child but arrives
on the scene of the accident shortly thereafter is nothing but a poor arbitrary rule
at best. While it is true that a distinction is probably necessary in order to prevent
a tide of litigation based upon questionable claims, it appears that the correct rule,
although likewise arbitrary, should be a little less restrictive than that adopted by
the Court in Perlmutter.
Id. at 367-68, 241 N.W.2d at 210. The court went on to adopt the factors suggested by
Dean Prosser and which were adopted in Dillon. In holding for the defendant the court
reasoned that "the complaint does not allege that the injury to the individual plaintiffs
was fairly contemporaneous with the accident." Id. at 369, 241 N.W.2d at 211. The court
used two California cases to explain the meaning of "fairly contemporaneous," Archibald
v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, hearing denied (1969) (plaintiff ar-
rived on the scene within moments and recovered) and Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d
865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974) (the plaintiff arrived thirty minutes after the accident and
did not recover). In Miller v. Cook, 87 Mich. App. 6, 273 N.W.2d 567 (1978), the injury to
the child was intentional and the parents argued that they should recover even though
their injury was not fairly contemporaneous with the child's injury. The court disagreed,
holding that the Gustafson analysis applied whether the injury to the child was inten-
tionally or negligently caused.
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be tried by a court unwilling to make the entire leap to regulation by
general tort principles alone. Through this gradual development,
courts will be able to see through experience that extending the doc-
trine beyond the zone of danger rule does not lead to unlimited or
disproportionate liability. When a jurisdiction experiences a history of
success in dealing with one such extension its courts will feel more
comfortable with experimenting with a further extension. Through this
process courts will gain experience and learn not to fear the doctrine.
Many of the classic reasons for denying recovery (lack of precedent,
fraud, floodgates, and proof problems) are simply not valid; other
reasons (too burdensome, unlimited liability) are merely expressions of
the fear that the doctrine may prove uncontrollable in practice. This
author's view is that the control devices of torts, including duty, causa-
tion and the standard defenses which are available, will supply suffi-
cient control devices to keep the doctrine within proper bounds.
Hopefully, the area of bystander recovery for emotional distress caused
by viewing injury to another will eventually merge with and be
governed by general tort law.
The courts' testing of the doctrine through partial extensions is im-
portant because it provides actual proof, beyond mere logical argu-
ment, that only general tort principles are needed to insure recovery
by only meritorious plaintiffs. Each extension that has been made
(from impact to fear-for-self zone of danger to Dillon and beyond)
without unlimited and uncontrollable liability resulting has been ac-
companied by evidentiary proof that the doctrine was controllable
under general tort law. The evidence grows stronger as the arbitrary
limits on recovery more closely approximate general tort rules.
The California experience demonstrates that the three Dillon factors
effectively limit recovery and that new jurisdictions permitting a
bystander to recover should, therefore, adopt a rule that goes at least
as far.'67 Of course, as Rhode Island demonstrates, if a court remains
167. Pennsylvania is the most recent jurisdiction to permit bystander recovery for the
shock and trauma associated with viewing the child's negligently-caused death or injury.
In Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979), an automobile operated by defendant struck a
young girl who had been standing beside a rural road, hurling her through the air and
causing injuries which resulted in her death. Id. at 674. The victim's mother witnessed the
accident from a position near the front door of her home. Id. In an action filed against the
driver of the car by the victim's parents, the mother sought damages for the emotional
distress she experienced as a result of witnessing her daughter's death. No allegations
were made that the emotional distress was manifested in physical injury to the mother.
Id. at 674-75. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to that portion of the com-
plaint which sought such damages, reasoning that because the child's mother was not
within the zone of danger, she was precluded from recovering damages for her emotional
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unconvinced that the Dillon factors will be adequate to control the doc-
trine, other more restrictive methods of control are available.
Other jurisdictions such as Massachusetts and Hawaii have pushed
beyond Dillon and moved cloqer to regular tort rules. Just as the
Dillon experiment was watched with great interest so too will these
new extensions be examined. The doctrine will probably continue to
grow in the negligence area through the process of gradually expand-
ing steps. But as the negligence side of the doctrine grows the in-
congruity of allowing bystander recovery in negligence while denying
it under other theories will surface. Given this, it should come as no
distress. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed without opinion. Sinn v. Burd, 253 Pa.
Super. 627, 384 A.2d 1003 (1978).
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that recovery of
damages for negligently-caused mental trauma would not be precluded simply because the
plaintiff was outside the zone of danger of being struck by the negligent force. In an opin-
ion by Justice Nix, the court engaged in an extensive analysis of the various social and
legal policies relevant to a consideration of whether bystander recovery should be permit-
ted. The court initially rejected the argument that permitting recovery by third parties
for emotional distress would result in problems of proof, reasoning that the advancements
made in medical and psychiatric science during the twentieth century now make it possi-
ble to supply a causal link between the psychological damage suffered by a bystander and
the shock of trauma associated with his having witnessed the accident. Id. at 678-79. For
much the same reason, the court rejected defendant's argument that a cause of action for
third party emotional distress would be susceptible to fraud, noting that the available
medical and psychiatric methods make it very difficult for a malingerer to recover
damages. Id. at 679-80 (citing Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis,
and Law, 6 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 428, 435 (1957)). As to defendant's contention that permit-
ting bystander recovery would result in a flood of similar litigation, Justice Nix
characterized this fear as "specious," stating that the argument "does not offer a
legitimate consideration and ... the anticipated consequences are grossly overstated." Id.
at 680 n.12.
The remainder of Justice Nix' opinion dealt with the issue characterized by him as be-
ing "the heart of the controversy"- the formulation of methods for limiting recovery in
order to avoid unlimited or unduly burdensome liability. Following the lead taken by the
Supreme Court of Hawaii in Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974), the
majority in Sinn adopted the requirement that in order for a bystander's emotional
trauma to be compensable, there must be "serious mental distress." 404 A.2d at 683.
Justice Nix quoted with apparent approval the Hawaii court's definition of serious mental
distress "as being properly found where a reasonable person 'normally constituted, would
be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances' of
the event." Id. See notes 118-22 and accompanying text supra. Finally, as to the method
by which the Pennsylvania court would limit the scope of liability, Justice Nix concluded,
relying heavily upon the analysis embodied in the Dillon decision, that "the application of
the traditional tort concept of foreseeability will reasonably circumscribe the tortfeasor's
liability in such cases." 404 A.2d at 684. In the court's view, the relevant question of
foreseeability in situations involving mental distress sustained by a bystander would be
"whether the emotional injuries sustained by the plaintiff were reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant." Id.
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surprise that courts have begun to consider the area where the in-
congruity is most apparent-the application of the Dillon doctrine to
cases based on strict liability in tort. It should also come as no surprise
that this consideration began in California, the state which has the
longest history of successful experimentation with the doctrine in
negligence.
V. DILLON AND STRICT LIABILITY: RECENT CASES
Recently, two California cases have considered the extension of the
Dillon doctrine to actions grounded in strict liability in tort. A review
of these cases is appropriate because their conflicting holdings have
set the stage for eventual resolution of the issue by the California
Supreme Court.
In Park v. Standard Chem Way Co.,'68 plaintiff-husband was seriously
injured when a drain cleaner exploded during normal use. The husband
sued the manufacturer, distributor and retailer, claiming that the pro-
duct was defective because it did not warn of the possibility of explo-
sion in normal use.'69 Plaintiff-wife also sued, claiming, inter alia, that
she suffered emotional distress, shock and physical injuries upon find-
ing her injured husband. The retailer demurred to the cause of action
since no negligence was alleged.'7 ° The court conceded that the hus-
band's claim was valid in strict liability' 7 ' under the rule of Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products,'72 but held that the wife's claim was not ac-
tionable under Dillon absent an allegation of negligence. "' The holding
is troubling since no analysis is offered and the facts of the case did
not necessitate it.
The issue of the extension of the Dillon doctrine to strict liability
was allocated a mere two paragraphs in the opinion. 4 The rule was
168. 60 Cal. App. 3d 47, 131 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976).
169. Id. at 48-49, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
170. Id. at 49, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
171. Id. at 50, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
172. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
173. Park v. Standard Chem Way Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 50, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
174. Those two paragraphs contain no detailed or meaningful discussion of the issue:
Appellant's cause of action against Curb appears to be grounded on the doctrine
enunciated by Dillon v. Legg, which permits a close relative of the victim of an ac-
cident caused by the negligence of a third person who is present or in the zone of
danger at the time to recover against the negligent party for mental and emotional
pain and suffering by the relative. And secondly on the doctrine of loss of consor-
tium recently enunciated in California in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. [sic].
Dillon v. Legg does not apply for the following reasons. The complaint is based
on strict liability, warranty, and negligence of Standard Chem Way Company, the
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stated but not justified or explained. There was no discussion for or
against extending the doctrine and no rationale for the denial was of-
fered. The court essentially denied the cause of action solely because
of a lack of precedent for such an extension, a reason which has been
shown earlier to be unsatisfactory. 17 Moreover, there was absolutely
no necessity for the court's broad holding. Plaintiff-wife alleged that
she returned from work approximately two and one-half hours after
the explosion and found her husband permanently scarred on his arms,
torso, and legs.'76 The emotional distress was caused by hearing about
the accident from her husband and from seeing the aftermath hours
later. The facts fail two of the three Dillon requirements. The wife was
not near the scene of the accident, and more importantly, she had no
contemporaneous sensory impact of the accident. Even if the action
had been based upon negligence, no recovery would have been
available under Dillon. 77 This being so, Park seems to be a particularly
inappropriate vehicle for the consideration of the doctrine. In the
absence of any legal analysis on the point and in view of the facts of
the case, Park stands essentially for the proposition that what has not
before been done should not be done.Shepard v. Superior Court 7' offered facts somewhat more conducive
to a consideration of the extension issue. Father, mother and their
children were driving in their Pinto which allegedly was defectively
manufactured so as to contain a defect in design or manufacture of the
rear door locking mechanism. Because of the defect, and upon being
struck by another car, the rear door opened, causing two of the
children to be thrown out, one of whom was run over by another
automobile. 179 Here the parent-plaintiffs were present at the time of
the accident. They witnessed the events and hence had a contem-
poraneous perception of it. The relationship of the plaintiff to the dece-
dent was of the closest kind. The case would have stated a cause of ac-
tion under Dillon had the defect been caused by the negligence of the
manufacturer. Curb is joined as a retailer of the product involved. Nothing in the
complaint suggests any negligence on the part of Curb and appellant was not in the
zone of danger at the time of the accident.
Id, at 50, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 339 (citations omitted).
175. See notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra.
176. Park v. Standard Chem Way Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 49, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
177. See note 40 supra. It is possible that the brief reference to plaintiffs being out-
side the zone of danger, in the passage quoted in note 174 supra, is intended to imply that
the three factors are not met. If so the passage is far from clear.
178. 76 Cal. App. 3d. 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977), hearing denied (1978).
179. Id. at 18-19, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14. The intervening negligence of the second
driver, however, clouds the case factually. It is, perhaps, not the best case upon which to
base an extension of the doctrine for that reason.
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manufacturer. Also, the facts satisfied the Greenman requirements for
an action in strict liability, which provide that "a manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being." '
In light of these facts the court concluded that defendant "Ford
owes a duty to petitioners on the related theories of strict liability and
warranty.'' 8 In so holding the court correctly noted that the policy ra-
tionales of strict liability were served by the result.'82 Additionally, the
court examined the causation chain from the defective product to the
injured plaintiff and found that the injury was within the scope of
foreseeable risks run by the manufacturer in marketing a defective
product."' Uniquely, the case involves physical injury caused by the
mental distress of witnessing injury to another, and in many ways is
similar to any other products case. Here, a bystander has suffered
physical injury caused by a defect in a product. The question is, who
should bear the loss? The same basic policy rationales apply to this
case as to other product liability actions.'84
180. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 700.
181. Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d at 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
182. Id. at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
183. Id
184. In Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973),
Mr. Justice Harrison enumerated a number of these basic policy rationales as follows:
(1) The manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against their recur-
rence, which the consumer cannot do.
(2) The cost of injury may be overwhelming to the person injured while the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and be distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business.
(3) It is in the public interest to discourage the marketing of defective products.
(4) It is in the public interest to place responsibility for injury upon the manufac-
turer who was responsible for its reaching the market.
(5) That this responsibility should also be placed upon the retailer and wholesaler
of the defective product in order that they may act as the conduit through
which liability may flow to reach the manufacturer, where ultimate respon-
sibility lies.
(6) That because of the complexity of present day manufacturing processes and
their secretiveness, the ability to prove negligent conduct by the injured plain-
tiff is almost impossible.
(7) That the consumer does not have the ability to investigate for himself the
soundness of the product.
(8) That this consumer's vigilance has been lulled by advertising, marketing
devices and trademarks.
Inherent in these policy considerations is not the nature of the transaction by which
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As has been shown, it is not enough to demonstrate that under the
normal workings of the strict liability doctrine the plaintiff would
recover, even if such recovery would further the policy rationales of
the doctrine. It must also be determined whether any valid objections
to the extension of the doctrine exist to outweigh plaintiffs claims.
The majority in Shepard did not discuss any of the classic objections to
the Dillon doctrine although many of these, in addition to new ones,
were raised by Justice Kane in a dissenting opinion. The objections of
Justice Kane included lack of precedent, intent of products liability to
compensate physical injuries only, difficulty of proving damages,
fraudulent claims, lack of moral blame or fault, and liability out of pro-
portion to industry's ability to pay or insurance to absorb. ' The ma-
jority in Shepard began the job of analysis, but failed to pursue it
through careful examination of the objections raised by Justice Kane
in his dissenting opinion. The validity of those objections in the strict
liability context must be examined as a necessary precondition to the
extension of the doctrine.
VI. DILLON'S OTHER LEG
In considering the extension of the Dillon doctrine to strict liability
for defective products it becomes apparent that at least some of the
objections are not new. In fact, they are the same ones which have
been raised ever since recovery for emotional distress and accompany-
ing physical injuries was first contemplated. They have surfaced
regularly as each liberalization of the doctrine has been considered. To
the extent that these objections have been discussed earlier in the ar-
ticle they will receive little attention here. Lack of precedent, fraud
and proof problems are such objections. '86 There is nothing inherently
the consumer obtained possession of the defective product, but the character of the
defect itself, that is, one occurring in the manufacturing process and the
unavailability of an adequate remedy on behalf of the injured plaintiff.
Id. at 506, 513 P.2d at 273 (quoting Judge Jacobson's concurring opinion in Lechuga, Inc.
v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256 (1970)) (citations omitted).
185. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 22-27, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 616-19 (Kane, J., dissenting).
186. For a discussion of these issues in the negligence context, see notes 15-22 and
32-55 and accompanying text supra. Much of that discussion applies to the strict liability
context. Only where the difference in the basis of the action materially changes the
analysis need the issues be further discussed. Logically, if an issue has been discredited in
the negligence context, and if no additional elements are raised because of the change in
the basis of the claim from negligence to strict liability, then the issue is also discredited
in the strict liability context.
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more difficult in proving mental distress caused by a defective product
than mental distress caused by defendant's negligence. Recalling the
prior hypotheticals, it is clear that the cause of the injury-the
negligent operation of the vehicle on the one hand and the defective
manufacture of it on the other-have little to do with proof of injury.
In both cases the same car crashes into the same child, causing the
same degree of emotional distress in the watching mother. It is the
sensory impression of the accident which causes the injury to the
mother and not the particular cause of the accident. Indeed, it is doubt-
ful whether the mother will know the legal cause of the injury until
later. Since no special problems in proving the validity of the mental
distress exist, these reasons against extension carry no more weight in
strict liability than in negligence. Previously, such problems have not
been viewed as serious, and have been rejected by the California
courts.'87 The fear of fraud rests upon the problems of proof, a problem
which appears to have little substance. The lack of precedent has also
been discussed and rejected, as has the fear that the amount of litiga-
tion will prove unmanageable.
An interesting contention raised by the dissenting opinion in
Shepard is that the policy of strict liability is to compensate physical
injuries only.'88 Although Justice Kane did not explain the reason for
this view'89 it should be noted, as the Shepard majority did, that in
California only emotional distress resulting in physical injuries may be
compensated under Dillon and that any extension of the doctrine to
strict liability actions would carry this same limitation.9 '
Justice Kane believed' that dicta in Dillon foreclosed strict liability
recoveries. This belief was founded upon the Dillon court's statement
187. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
188. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 23, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 616 (Kane, J., dissenting).
189. The only California case cited by Justice Kane to support his contention is Seely
v. White Motor Co. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), which dealt with
whether economic loss could be recovered in a strict liability action. The court saw a dif-
ference between expecting that a product will not injure the plaintiff and expecting that
the product will merely fail to meet the economic expectations of the purchaser. The lat-
ter, they believed, was more properly left to claims based upon warranty. In this context
Seely does not seem to be strong authority against allowing a recovery for emotional
distress in strict liability actions. Emotional injury to the plaintiff is surely closer to
physical injury than to mere commercial loss.
190. This is so because the court in Shepard adopted the Dillon doctrine in toto, in-
cluding the three factors and other duty limitations. Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.
App. 3d at 19, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
191. Id. at 25-26, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19 (Kane, J., dissenting).
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that the basis for claims "must be the adjudicated liability and fault of
defendant."'92 In fact, this comment was made in the context of a claim
by the defendant in Dillon that the contributory negligence of the child
partly caused the accident. In that context the Dillon court made clear
that any successful defense against the child would foreclose the
recovery by the plaintiff witness. The entire Dillon cause of action,
therefore, was made contingent upon the successful claim by the
child. "'93 The view of the Dillon majority was that since the basis of the
mother's claim is the harm caused by defendant to the child which the
mother witnessed, it would be incongruous to find that the harm done
to the child was not legally compensable while the mother received
compensation for viewing that self-same injury. The same logic would
hold that if the defect in the product were not the cause of the injury
to the child, or if the child misused the product so as to preclude his
recovery, no secondary action by the mother for viewing the injury
could be maintained.
In this context, the comment by the Dillon court upon which Justice
Kane relies in Shepard was not addressed to questions of strict liability
and was not intended to foreclose such recovery. Rather, the comment
was part of a larger statement firmly conditioning the mother's
recovery, under whatever theory, upon the requirement that the child
himself be entitled to recover. It must be concluded that Justice Kane
took the sentence out of context and used it to justify what appears to
be the true basis for his dissent in Shepard, which is a hostility to the
whole doctrine of strict liability in tort:
Paying heed to economic realities rather than our own fancy, the courts
as a matter of judicial policy must stop the further extension of strict
liability of entrepreneurs, at least to areas where, as here, the determina-
tion of damages is speculative and conjectural rather than real and
definable.'"
Leaving aside the fact that it has been shown that such damages are
not speculative or conjectural and that they can be defined and
proved,' Justice Kane's attack upon strict liability in tort still re-
mains. But it is a questionable method of reforming the products liability
area to arbitrarily declare a moratorium upon legitimate claims. Even
the United States Department of Commerce, which has attempted to
accomplish many reforms in products law, has noted that the current
uncertainty in the area has led to "[p]anic 'reform' efforts that would
192. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
193. I&
194. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 29, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 620 (Kane, J., dissenting).
195. See notes 32-46 and accompanying text supr.
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unreasonably curtail the rights of product users.""'9 An absolute ban on
further development of the strict liability doctrine would seem to be
such an uncalled for panic reaction.
Once again there is a meritorious plaintiff-mother who witnesses her
child's death or serious injury. Her right to recover for her own injury
is difficult to deny. Clearly, the defect in the product caused a real and
acute injury. Under normal operation of strict liability principles in
California the mother would recover.'97 The preferred approach to tort
problems is to allow the general principles of tort recovery to function
without placing special limitations upon duty. If some strong policy
considerations demand limitations, they should be as consistent with
general tort principles as is possible. As has been demonstrated, many
of the objections to the doctrine are invalid.
Given this, the real issue emerges. This issue has arisen before in
the negligence context, and is implicit in the comments of Justice Kane
in Shepard. Can the extent of liability and the scope of the doctrine be
controlled in strict liability? While most people would grant recovery
to the plaintiff-mother in our hypothetical case, and while the number
of such plaintiff-mothers is probably not so large as to unduly burden
American industry, the real fear lurking below the surface is that the
doctrine, once allowed, will have no stopping point and that courts will
be unable to adequately control the extent of liability. The fear is that
in later unimagined cases the number of potential plaintiffs and the ex-
tent of the manufacturer's liability will be too burdensome. Once it is
demonstrated that the doctrine can be controlled in negligence, the
fear of unlimited liability under that theory becomes groundless.'98
However, this does not guarantee control of the doctrine in the strict
liability context. This final problem must be considered if courts are to
risk the extension.
VII. DILLON AND STRICT LIABILITY: CONTROLLING THE DOCTRINE
Under Shepard, the Dillon doctrine has been extended to cases in
which the plaintiff-witness suffers emotional harm and physical injuries
from viewing the injury to another when the injury to the other is
caused by a defective product.'99 How can the doctrine be controlled?
Many of the control devices in Dillon are equally applicable to situa-
tions involving strict liability, since the plaintiff-witness must have suf-
196. DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW § 101(a)(4). See 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2997
(Jan. 12, 1979).
197. See 76 Cal. App. 3d at 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
198. See Part III supra.
199. See notes 178-85 and accompanying text supra.
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fered physical injuries as a result of her emotional distress. This
device alone rules out many potential plaintiffs. Secondly, the three
Dillon factors of relationship, location, and contemporaneous sensory
impact apply to these cases. The history of these requirements in rela-
tion to standards of negligence demonstrates that only a limited class
of plaintiffs will recover under these rules. When interpreting these
rules, courts have indicated that an accident or other sudden trauma-
causing event is required for recovery. A lingering event (such as a
hospital stay) will not suffice, nor will being told of the event as opposed
to perceiving it in person."'
As has been demonstrated, the three Dillon factors have been viewed
as binding rules of duty. The absence of any one factor seems to be
enough to indicate that plaintiff may not recover under Dillon. It
follows that the rules must be viewed not merely as guidelines in
establishing foreseeability, but as special judicially-created rules to
limit a duty which would otherwise exist under general tort
principles.01 In this context, the application of the rules to strict liability
cases is acceptable. Any rules required by courts which allow them to
control the doctrine are acceptable. The arbitrary lines should be
drawn as far toward allowing the operation of normal tort doctrine as
the courts can adequately control."2  The maximum number of
meritorious plaintiffs should recover while not unduly burdening the
ability of the manufacturing process to absorb the cost.
The three factors, then, are an attempt to control the scope of liability
both in negligence and in strict liability. While not perfect, they will
200. It has been suggested that the three factors are inappropriate in a strict liability
context because the factors are guides to defining foreseeability in negligence. See 17
DUQ. L. REv. 535 (1978-79). The basis of this suggestion is that the three factors may be
appropriate as duty definers in Dillon, but are inappropriate in the context of strict
liability cases such as Shepard, because foreseeability is not at issue in such cases. Id at
542. The fundamental error in this approach is that the three factors formulated by the
court in Dillon are primarily duty limiters, rather than duty definers. Moreover,
foreseeability is not entirely foreign to strict liability. See, e.g., Elmore v. American
Motors Corp. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (strict liability for defec-
tive products extended to bystanders where the injury to the bystanders was reasonably
foreseeable).
201. Not only will the three Dillon factors give the court the control it wants over the
scope of the doctrine; they will also keep the recovery in strict liability co-extensive with
that allowed in negligence. Because one of the purposes of strict liability is to eliminate
plaintiffs proof problems in negligence, see 17 DUQ. L. REV. at 542-43, it would be in-
congruous to allow such recovery in negligence but to deny it merely because plaintiff's
action is based on strict liability.
202. It is to be hoped that eventually the California Supreme Court will abolish the
three factors and allow general tort principles to function both in negligence and strict
liability cases; no evidence of this has been seen to date. It may be left to courts such as
those in Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Michigan to lead the way in that direction.
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hold the scope of recovery in strict liability to that now allowed in
negligence. The advantage is that experience with the Dillon doctrine
in negligence has shown that, with these restrictions, the level of
liability will not be excessive and the number of plaintiffs will not be
large. The same should be true in strict liability. In general, the doc-
trine can be circumscribed by the use of the same controlling factors
that are used in negligence. Courts adopting Shepard should do so to
the same extent and with the same rules as that particular jurisdiction
applies in Dillon cases.
For jurisdictions that desire to adopt the Dillon doctrine in strict
liability cases, but which are not yet convinced that the negligence con-
trol factors will be adequate, more cautious controlling rules can be
formulated. One possible approach would be that used by the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, confining recovery to mothers, parents or some
other narrow group."3 If the number of plaintiffs recovering under
such a rule is not unreasonably large, further extensions can be con-
templated. Another possible approach would be to focus upon the type
of product that is involved and to ask whether the manufacturer could
foresee that a close relative would witness injury caused by that
defect. For example, a manufacturer of a home appliance, such as a
washing machine, would be expected to foresee that the product would
be used in proximity to children and parents, making it likely that an
injury from a defect could injure a child with his parents looking on. In
contrast, a crane used only for loading holds of cargo ships is not the
kind of product which is used in the vicinity of parents and children.
Therefore, a plaintiff-parent, who observes his child injured by such a
product, and sustains emotional injury as a result, is not as
foreseeable. This might justify erecting a barrier to such recoveries. 4
This author believes that none of the above special limitations upon
strict liability recovery are necessary and that general strict liability
principles, with all the normal allowable defenses, will contain the doc-
trine to manageable levels. The above control devices are offered only
to show that it is possible to construct such limits in the strict liability
context just as has been done by a number of jurisdictions in the
negligence area. In California, the first extension of the doctrine to
strict liability should probably be accomplished by following the
Shepard approach of making recovery in strict liability co-extensive
with recovery in negligence and using the same limitations. As the doc-
trine is extended in negligence, it should be extended in strict liability
as well.
203. See notes 148-54 and accompanying text supra.
204. This last approach has little connection to general theory of strict liability but is
offered as one additional example of an arbitrary line which could be drawn as an interim
step toward controlling the scope of recovery in strict liability cases.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In Dillon, the California Supreme Court took an important step in
moving third party emotional distress recovery into the mainstream of
tort doctrine. By crashing through the zone of danger rule, California
has led the way in an experiment that is leading more and more courts
toward the application of general tort principles to this area, which has
always suffered under burdensome and unnecessary special limitations.
While not the final step in the process, it is a vital part of the doctrinal
development. Since Dillon, the California experience has demonstrated
that California was correct to risk the extension. The fears of many
were proved to be groundless and the predicted problems failed to
materialize.
Now it is time to risk the next extension of the doctrine-an exten-
sion that is necessary to eliminate an incongruity in the law. Again,
many predict problems and dire results if such an extension is made,
but these results seem unlikely. Various judicially created control
devices can circumscribe the doctrine to avoid unfairness while allow-
ing meritorious plaintiffs to recover. Shepard, then, was correctly
decided. Following the rationales and rules of strict liability, the court
equalized the rules of tort recovery while adopting realistic rules to
restrict recovery to manageable levels. Although not the final step in
the development of the doctrine, the Shepard approach continues to
carry the trend in the right direction.
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